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FALLING INTO THE THEORETICAL ABYSS
Christina E. Wells*
In 1951, in the midst of the Red Scare and at the height of
McCarthyism, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
fate of several American leaders of the Communist Party who were
convicted under the Smith Act of conspiring to advocate forcible
overthrow of the government.' In the years preceding Dennis v.
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all of which vastly improved the final product. I also am indebted to Tracy Coyle, Mondi
Ghasedi, Rikki Jones and Bob Reinhardt for their helpful research and editorial criticisms.
Finally, I am grateful for the generous financial support provided by the University of
Missouri Law School Foundation through the John K. Hulston Faculty Research Fellowship,
the James C. Morrow Faculty Research Fellowship, the William F. Sutter Faculty Research
Fellowship, and the Gary A. Tatlow Faculty Research Fellowship.
1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (plurality opinion). The Smith Act makes
it a crime to "knowingly ... advocateD, abet[], adviseg] or teach] the duty, necessity,
desirability or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States
or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government
of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence ... ." 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994). It
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United States, the Court demonstrated an increased commitment
to the protection of advocacy via the use of the "clear and present
danger" test.2 The Dennis Court, however, perverted that test,
finding that the convictions did not violate the First Amendment,
even though there were serious questions "as to whether suffi-
cient-or, indeed, any-evidence of [criminal wrongdoing] had been
introduced at the Dennis trial."3 The public exalted the Court's
decision.' Justice Black, however, deplored its political nature,
commenting that
[p]ublic opinion being what it now is, few will protest
the conviction of these Communist petitioners.
There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when
present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or
some later Court will restore the First Amendment
liberties to the high preferred place where they
belong in a free society.5
Eventually, calmer times prevailed and the Supreme Court backed
away from Dennis. Only six years after that decision, the Court in
Yates v. United States6 reversed the convictions of several Commu-
nist Party leaders even though the case involved issues almost
identical to Dennis. The Yates Court arrived at its ruling "as a
further prohibits citizens from "organiz[ing] or help[ing] or attempt[ing] to organize" any
group which engages in such advocacy. Id.
'The test was the modem Court's first attempt to determine when the First Amendment
permitted punishment of speech. Specifically, it required the Court to ask "whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION 123-91 (1988) (discussing Court's application of test in different cases).
' Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of
Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1991); see also MICHAL R.
BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 6 (1977) (noting that only way to uphold convictions was "by
modifying the accepted interpretation of the First Amendment").
" See, e.g., Freedom With Security, WASH. POST, June 6, 1951, at 12 ("The Supreme
Court's decision upholding the conviction of the 11 Communist leaders is the most important
reconciliation of liberty and security in our time."); see also infra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text (describing public reaction).
5 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting).
6354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957), overruled inpart by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
[Vol. 33:1
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matter of statutory interpretation, albeit with constitutional
principles hovering closely above."' Thus, although the Court did
not explicitly overrule the constitutional decision in Dennis, it
nevertheless largely "eliminat[ed] the Smith Act as a weapon in the
campaign against American Communism."8
The Court's free speech jurisprudence has evolved significantly
since Dennis and Yates. The decade of the 1960s and the Warren
Court era saw notable expansion and entrenchment of the First
Amendment rights of political speakers.9 The once malleable
"clear and present danger" test evolved into far more rigid rules
designed to protect speech from government censorship.'0 More-
over, the Court's rhetoric in this period further signified its strong
commitment to free speech." Thus, the First Amendment rights
of political speakers are now firmly entrenched. The political
persecution and manipulation of precedent that occurred in the
earlier cases involving communists simply could not happen in this
arena of rigidly protective rules. Or could it?
Two recent cases involving anti-abortion protestors, another
unpopular group, arguably present a pattern similar to Dennis and
Yates. The Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 2 both
7 Rohr, supra note 3, at 68.
8 KALVEN, supra note 2, at 220.
' See Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know it Learned from the
Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 468-72 (1997) (discussing Warren Court's free speech
decisions); Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE 68, 68-81 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) (discussing emergence of free
speech tradition under Warren Court).
" The "clear and present danger" test eventually evolved into the relatively stringent test
announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969), which allows suppression
of subversive advocacy only when it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Moreover, the Court in recent decades
has adopted more explicit rules prohibiting, both directly and indirectly, government
suppression of particular viewpoints. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy:
Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 173-75 (1997) (discussing Court's stringent review of content-
based and viewpoint-based regulations of speech).
" For examples of the Court's more enduring rhetoric see New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), illustrating the Court's commitment "to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," and Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989), stating that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
12 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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upheld and struck down portions of an injunction restricting the
speech of anti-abortion protestors. Those subject to the injunction
and their supporters lambasted the decision to uphold it, arguing
that the Court was motivated by anti-abortion protestor animus.'"
In addition, Justice Scalia accused the Madsen majority of ignoring
past precedent and allowing the "ad hoc nullification machine" of
abortion to override the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 4
Three years later, the Court again faced the constitutionality of
injunctions restricting the speech of anti-abortion protestors. As in
Madsen, the Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 5 upheld and
struck down portions of an injunction. The reaction to Schenck,
however, differed from the reaction to Madsen. Focusing on the
Court's decision to strike down portions of the injunction, the
protestors lauded it as a recognition by the Court that its earlier
decision unfairly restricted their First Amendment rights. 6 Even
neutral observers characterized Schenck as a strong affirmation of
the rights of speakers. 7
Judging from the above reactions, Madsen and Schenck appear
to parallel the pattern exhibited in Dennis and Yates. The
protestors' response to Madsen intimates that the Madsen Court,
like the Dennis Court before it, deviated from its previous staunch
protection of political expression as a result of political opposition
to abortion protestors. Similarly, protestor and public response to
Schenck indicate parallels to Yates insofar as Schenck represents
the Court's implicit acknowledgment that Madsen had gone too far.
But a closer examination of Madsen and Schenck reveals that they
are unlike Dennis and Yates. Though one might argue that the
Madsen Court ultimately erred in upholding the injunction, given
"' Craig Crawford, A Victory for Abortion-Rights Activists, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 1,
1994, at Al (noting that in Madsen "[tihe U.S. Supreme Court blunted the free speech claims
of anti-abortion demonstrators").
14 512 U.S. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
'5 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
1 6See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justices Rule Abortion Protest Is Free Speech, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1997, at Al (quoting Jay Sekulow, attorney for protestors, as stating that Court had
finally recognized that "the [First] Amendment applies to the pro-life message").
7 See, e.g., David G. Savage, "In-Your-Face" Speech Wins in Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1997, at Al (characterizing Schenck as win for "[firee speech of the loud, aggressive,
in-your-face variety").
[Vol. 33:1
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the relative uniqueness of the issue facing that Court, it is difficult
to say that past doctrine compelled a different result. Moreover,
Madsen and Schenck are not inconsistent with one another.
Schenck is essentially a straightforward application of the earlier
decision.
Why, then, do the above-described reactions to Madsen and
Schenck paint such a contrasting picture? Ironically, the answer
is that the Court's opinions lend themselves to this kind of public
manipulation. Though the Court has embraced doctrine and
rhetoric regarding the protection of speech, it has never developed
a coherent and explicit philosophical theory underlying its deci-
sions." As Professor Post noted, "contemporary First Amendment
doctrine is . .. striking chiefly for its superficiality, its internal
incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive judicial
engagement with significant contemporary social issues connected
with freedom of speech .... [It] has become increasingly a doctrine
of words merely, and not of things." 9 Thus, the Court's decisions
have evolved haphazardly and are empty and easily manipulable,
as Madsen and Schenck aptly illustrate." Both cases epitomize
" To be sure, the Court has announced "general principles" supporting protection of
speech. For example, the Court often bases its decision to protect speech upon the notion
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
534 (1980) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). Similarly, the Court has intimated that the protection of speech is necessary
to facilitate democratic self-governance. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
50-51 (1988). Finally, the Supreme Court sometimes notes that protection of speech is
necessary to facilitate notions of personal autonomy and self-expression. See, e.g., New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). But it has never attempted to explain when
these different principles come into play or how they propel its doctrine. Moreover, the
Court does not consistently describe even a single principle from opinion to opinion. See
Wells, supra note 10, at 172 & nn.53-54 (citing cases in which Court has sometimes
described its autonomy rationale as speaker's right of self-expression and at other times has
characterized it as listener's right to receive information).
" Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50
(1995).
" The abortion protest cases are by no means the only evidence of this emptiness. As
another example, one need only look to the increasing fragmentation of the Court's recent
free speech decisions which are often comprised of five-to-four or plurality opinions. See, e.g.,
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997); Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996);
Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
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the Court's tendency to focus on minutiae rather than on the
difficult philosophical and doctrinal issues raised in so many free
speech cases. They further reflect the Court's habit, when it does
discuss such questions, of supporting its decisions by simply citing
to past precedent with little or no explanation. Moreover, that
reliance on precedent is often selective and ignores (or only
superficially attempts to reconcile) the numerous, potentially
contradictory precedents that exist. The ultimate result of such
actions is the public manipulation of Court decisions referred to
above-a dangerous and, perhaps, increasingly common reaction
given "the cynical view, already popular among [the Court's] critics,
that constitutional law is only a matter of which president appoint-
ed the last few justices."2 '
Part I of this article briefly reviews the legal and social context
of Dennis and Yates. Parts II and III similarly review Madsen and
Schenck in order to show potential parallels to the earlier commu-
nist decisions. Part IV further examines both Madsen and Schenck,
demonstrating that, from a doctrinal standpoint, they are far
removed from the earlier communist cases. Finally, Part V
explains how the Court in Madsen and Schenck actually contrib-
uted to misconceptions or manipulation of its opinions. Specifically,
Part V examines the Madsen and Schenck Courts' approaches to
three of the more difficult doctrinal issues facing them-prior
restraint, the place of motive in content-discrimination, and
regulation of offensive speech in the public forum-and concludes
that the Court's tendency to rely blindly on rhetoric and precedent
without further discussion leaves its decisions vulnerable to
misconstruction and manipulation.
I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF DENNIS AND YATES
A. DENNIS V. UNITED STATES: A POLITICAL DECISION IN THE MAKING
In 1949, after a nine-month trial, a federal jury convicted eleven
leaders of the Communist Party USA of conspiring "to advocate and
622 (1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
21 Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 53.
[Vol. 33:1
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teach the duty" of forcible overthrow of the government in violation
of the Smith Act.22 Significantly, the defendants were not charged
with or convicted of attempting to overthrow the government or of
actually advocating overthrow of the government.23 Even the
government attorneys were aware that no evidence existed to
support either of those charges.24 Instead, the defendants were
charged with and convicted of a crime one step re-
moved-conspiring to advocate the forcible overthrow of the
government. The conviction rested on evidence showing that the
defendants, in the course of organizing and advancing the Commu-
nist Party, did nothing more than distribute pamphlets and
organize classes to teach Marxist-Leninist doctrine." According
to the courts and the government, however, such doctrine involved
the teaching of forcible overthrow as a necessary aspect of the
communist revolution. As Judge Hand described the evidence,
Marxist-Leninist doctrine held that
capitalism inescapably rests upon, and must perpetu-
ate, the oppression of those who do not own the
means of production; that to it in time there must
22 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1951) (describing trial and convictions).
For text of the Smith Act, see supra note 1.
2 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497.
" As one author noted, "[i]f the Justice Department had possessed evidence that the
CPUSA was plotting a revolt, it could have prosecuted the organization's leaders for seditious
conspiracy. 'However, it is highly doubtful-at least on the basis of presently available
evidence-... that a case could be made out against such individuals.'" BELKNAP, supra
note 3, at 80-81 (quoting unidentified government attorney); see also PETER L. STEINBERG,
THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED STATES PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-
1952 166 (1984) (discussing testimony of Communist Party witnesses).
2 See United States. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), affd 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(noting numerous pamphlets regarding Marxist-Leninist doctrine put forth as evidence at
trial); United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367,382 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (referring to evidence of"an
elaborate and far-reaching network of schools and classes established for the propagation of
the Marxist-Leninist principles").
The grand jury indictment of the defendants set the stage for a conviction based on such
evidence by grounding its allegations of a conspiracy on the facts that defendants "published
and circulated books, articles, magazines and newspapers advocating the principles of
Marxism-Leninism" and "conducted schools and classes for the study of the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, in which would be taught and advocated the duty and necessity of
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence."
Harold Faber, 400 Police on Duty as 12 Communists Go on Trial Today, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1949, at 1 (listing contents of indictments).
1998]
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succeed a "classless" society, which will finally make
unnecessary most of the paraphernalia of govern-
ment; but that there must be an intermediate and
transitional period of the "dictatorship, of the prole-
tariat," which can be established only by the violent
overthrow of any existing [capitalistic] government."
Thus, it was enough to sustain the Smith Act convictions that the
defendants had formed a group to engage in advocacy of a doctrine
favorably referring to the need for forcible overthrow at some
undetermined point in the future.
Because the charges against the Dennis defendants essentially
amounted to "organizing a group to commit a speech crime,"27 the
Supreme Court reviewed the convictions in order to evaluate their
legitimacy under the First Amendment. By a six-to-two vote, the
Court ruled that the convictions did not violate the defendants' free
speech rights.2" Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the plurality,
ostensibly applied the "clear and present danger" test, which he
believed originated in the Court's earlier decision in Schenck v.
United States29 and which had been applied in numerous subse-
quent decisions."0 Drawing on Judge Hand's enunciation of the
test below, Chief Justice Vinson noted that "[in each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.""' In this instance, the significant danger
posed by the communist conspiracy far outweighed the lack of
imminence with respect to potential overthrow of the government:
' Dennis, 183 F.2d at 206 (emphasis added) (summarizing evidence in support of Judge
Hand's conclusion that it was sufficient to support convictions). Throughout their trial and
appeals the defendants maintained that they did not teach forcible overthrow as a necessary
aspect of their doctrine but rather that it was a possible result of the clash between the
proletariat and ousted capitalistic rulers. Id.
27 KALVEN, supra note 2, at 193.
' Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516.
29 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
' Dennis, 341 U.S. at 504 (citing Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1920); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)).
" Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (quoting Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212).
[Vol. 33:1
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Obviously, the [clear and present danger test]
cannot mean that before the Government may act, it
must wait until the putsch is about to be executed
.... If Government is aware that a group aiming at
its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its mem-
bers and to commit them to a course whereby they
will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances
permit, action by the government is required....
... The formation by petitioners of such a highly
organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined mem-
bers ... , coupled with the inflammable nature of
world conditions, similar uprisings in other coun-
tries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations
with countries with whom petitioners were in the
very least ideologically attuned, convince us that
their convictions were justified on this score. 2
The public strongly supported the Court's decision. Indeed,
almost all major newspapers in the country lauded it, 33 claiming
that "[tihe American people in overwhelming majority will rejoice
in this judicial affirmation of the nation's right and power."34
Such claims mirrored the response of the public to the earlier trial
verdict, after which the trial judge "quickly became a national hero,
reportedly receiving fifty thousand congratulatory letters within a
week of the trial's end."35 On the other hand, most contemporary
legal commentators criticized the decision, claiming that the Court
had perverted the "clear and present danger" test in order to
uphold the convictions.36 Dennis did have its supporters in the
32 Id. at 509-11.
"See BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 14142 (noting that such papers as New York Times,
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Denver Post, San Francisco Chronicle,
and New Orleans Times-Picayune reacted favorably to decision). Public support was so
strong that only five major newspapers dared to express opposition to the decision. Id. at
141.
4 Id. (quoting New Orleans Times-Picayune).
3GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 608 (1994).
"See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle or
Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1952); Louis B. Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and
the "Clear and Present Danger' Rule, 38 VA. L. REV. 143, 154-57 (1952); John A. Gorfinkel
& Julian W. Mack, Jr., Dennis v. United States and the Cle'ar and Present Danger Rule, 39
CAL. L. REv. 475, 488-96 (1951); Robert McCloskey, Free Speech, Sedition and the
19981
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legal arena, however." And, at least superficially, the plurality
opinion was not utterly inconsistent with prior decisions. After all,
it was never clear that Schenck's iteration of the "clear and present
danger" test was especially speech-protective in the subversive
advocacy context-especially given that early applications of the
test in the subversive advocacy context almost always resulted in
affirmation of convictions.3' Furthermore, two of the Court's most
significant cases in the subversive advocacy context did not even
apply the test to statutes specifically criminalizing speech and
advocacy, instead deferring to legislative determinations that the
speech posed a danger necessitating prohibition. 9 In fact, the
Dennis plurality was forced to overturn both cases in order to apply
the test to the Smith Act.4 ° Thus, the "clear and present danger"
test had little actual content in terms of its application in this
particular context and one could argue that Chief Justice Vinson
Constitution, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 662, 667-69 (1951); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic
Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 217-23 (1952); Francis D. Wormuth,
Learned Legerdemain: A Grave But Implausible Hand, 6 W. POL. Q. 543, 554 (1953).
" See, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
CoLUM. L. REv. 313, 330-31 (1952) (discussing Dennis and noting that Communist leaders
"sought to bypass the democratic processes, not to use them").
' For examples of such affirmations, see Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919).
" See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,670 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 370 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Gitlow
Court acknowledged that the "clear and present danger" test was appropriate when
evaluating whether speech could be punished under statutes making certain acts unlawful:
[Wihere the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of
substantive evil,... if it be contended that the statute cannot be applied
to the language used by the defendant because of its protection by the
freedom of speech .... it must necessarily be found, as an original
question, without any previous determination by the legislative body,
whether the specific language used involved such likelihood of bringing
about the substantive evil as to deprive it of the constitutional protection.
268 U.S. at 670-71. In contrast, the Court believed that a legislative determination "that
utterances advocating the [forcible] overthrow of organized government ... involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power...
must be given great weight." Id. at 668.
4' See Dennis v. United States, 431 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (noting that no case had
expressly overruled Gitlow and Whitney, but emphasizing that subsequent opinions "inclined
toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale" in contrast to rationale of majority opinions in those
two cases).
[Vol. 33:1
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faithfully attempted to apply a relatively amorphous and standard-
less test.
But a closer examination of the broader legal and social contexts
framing Dennis lends far more credence to the dissenting Justices'
claim that "present pressures, passions and fears" infected the
plurality's reasoning, causing it to alter the "clear and present
danger" test for political reasons.4 First, Chief Justice Vinson's
application of that test, though giving a nod to Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, the fathers of "clear and present danger," ignored their
interpretation of that test. Justice Holmes, the author of Schenck,
believed that "clear and present danger" required both imminence
and a substantive evil.42 Justice Brandeis similarly argued that
"the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction [did] not exist
unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and
imminent danger of some substantive evil." 3 Such iterations are
quite different from Chief Justice Vinson's pliable test balancing
danger against imminence." Second, outside of the subversive
advocacy context, the Court had applied a strict version of the test,
as in Bridges v. California which held that "the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished."45 In the decade prior to
Dennis, such application increasingly resulted in significant
protection of speech.46 Thus, it was not as if Chief Justice Vinson
41 Id. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Neither prejudice nor hate nor senseless fear should be the basis of this solemn act. Free
speech.., should not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and objective proof of danger
that the evil advocated is imminent. On this record no one can say that petitioners... have
even the slightest chance of achieving their aims.").
42 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
44 Surely Chief Justice Vinson was correct in noting that "neither Justice Holmes nor
Justice Brandeis ever envisioned that a shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid
rule to be applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of'each case." Dennis, 341
U.S. at 508. There is, however, no evidence that either of them would have actually changed
their announced rule on a case-by-case basis.
45 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
46 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 157 (1943) ("There is a material
difference between agitation and exhortation calling for present violent action which creates
a clear and present danger of public disorder or other substantive evil, and mere doctrinal
justification or prediction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite
time.... ."); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (applying clear and
present danger test to find compulsory flag salute and pledge unconstitutional); Taylor v.
1998]
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lacked sources from which to draw to determine which version of
the test to apply. His decision to pick a version that appeared
nowhere in the Court's jurisprudence supports the notion that anti-
communist sentiment infected the Court's decision-especially since
such sentiment was unquestionably strong at that time.
Though communists enjoyed some measure of relief from public
hostility during World War II while the United States was allied
with the Soviet Union against Germany," after the war U.S.-
Soviet relations deteriorated rapidly, rekindling anti-communist
sentiment.48 Moreover, a series of local and world events in the
years immediately preceding Dennis fueled anti-communist fervor.
In 1948, the Soviet Union not only backed a coup that toppled
Czechoslovakia's democratic government,49 it also blockaded West
Berlin.5 ° In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb,
thus undoing "America's military advantage over the Soviet's [sic]
larger army" and spurring rumors that Americans had provided
them with the technology.5 ' In that same year, Mao Zedong took
over China.52 In 1950 Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were accused
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1943) (setting aside convictions under Mississippi statute
making it a crime to teach disloyalty because no clear and present danger existed); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("What finally emerges from the 'clear and present
danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (reversing conviction for breach of peace because no
clear and present danger existed and "[s]tate may not unduly suppress free communication
of views.., under the guise of conserving desirable conditions"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (holding that danger of injury to industrial concern is neither sufficiently
serious nor imminent to pass clear and present danger test).
"' See BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 35, 37-38 (discussing improved relations between
Communists and United States government during World War ID.
4' See id. at 41, 42 (discussing relations between United States and Soviet Union after
the War).
4 Albion Ross, Czech Reds Seizing Power, Occupy Some Ministries; Socialist Party Taken
Over, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1948, at 1; cf Drew Middleton, Benes Bows to Communists,
Gottwald Forms Cabinet; One Slain in Prague Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1948, at 1
(mentioning coup in Czechoslovakia and shock to British).
' See Herbert L. Matthews, Moscow Rejects Parley on Berlin to Break Impasse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1948, at 1 (discussing Soviet Union's rejection of demands to lift blockade on
West Berlin); Drew Middleton, Berlin Ban Stands as Russia Rebuffs Western Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 1948, at 1 (discussing Russia's refusal to reopen Berlin).
51 ALBERT FRIED, MCCARTIYISM, THE GREAT AMERICAN RED ScARE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 70 (1997).
52 Id.
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of spying for the Soviets.5 3 The early 1950s also saw the begin-
ning of the Korean War, which by 1951 was going quite badly for
the United States.54
Political actions taken in the United States further exacerbated
public fears caused by these events. During this period, the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) began full-blown
and very public investigations of alleged communist sympathiz-
ers.55 Among the most famous of these was the investigation of
Alger Hiss, a former official of the Departments of State and
Justice who was accused of spying for the Soviets, and later
jailed.56 President Truman issued an executive order establishing
federal loyalty review boards which provided for the expulsion from
federal jobs of anyone "disloyal" to the United States, and which
victimized thousands of people during the boards' existence."
Congress also joined the action by enacting restrictive legislation
aimed at communists." And, of course, there was Senator Joseph
McCarthy, whose famous "Wheeling" speech identifying "205 ...
[State Department employees known] to the Secretary of State as
being members of the communist party,"59 kicked off an era of
anti-communist hysteria that eventually took his name.6 ° Thus,
by the time the Supreme Court considered Dennis, Americans bore
53 See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR 62-69 (1978) (detailing Rosenberg trial).
' See Truman Orders U.S. Air, Navy Units to Fight in Aid of Korea, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1950, at 1 (reporting Truman's speech on Korean War); War is Declared by North
Koreans; Fighting on Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1950, at 1 (discussing declaration of war
by North Korea against South Korea); see also FRIED, supra note 51, at 71 (discussing war
developments and state of conflict in 1951).
's See CAUTE, supra note 53, at 491-502 (addressing HUAC activities regarding film
industry).
6 Id. at 58-61; MILTON R. KONVrIz, EXPANDING LIBERTIES 114-15 (1966).
"' Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1947). For a review of the results of the loyalty
board implementations, see CAUTE, supra note 53, at 268-92; FRIED, supra note 51, at 31-37.
' See generally Rohr, supra note 3, at 10-17 (reviewing federal anti-communist
legislation).
59 JIM TUCK, MCCARTHYISM AND NEW YORK'S HEARST PRESS 69 (1995). Though it is
unclear if McCarthy actually used the number "205" or the number "57" in his speech, see
EDWIN R. BAYLEY, JOE MCCARTHY AND THE PRESS 20-21 (1981), it remains undisputed that
he accused a substantial number of State Department employees of being communists.
' On the McCarthy era in general, see ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR (1970);
RICHARD M. FRIED, MEN AGAINST MCCARTHY (1976); RICHARD M. FREELAND, THE TRUMAN
DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF MCCARTHYISM (1972); JAMES RORTY & MOSHE DECTER,
MCCARTHY AND THE COMMUNISTS (1954).
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great antipathy to communists. A 1949 Gallup poll revealed that
sixty-eight percent of Americans wanted to outlaw the Communist
Party USA 6' and at least thirty-five percent feared that the
Communist Party "controlled important segments of the economy
and was getting stronger all the time."62
The events prior to Dennis and the overwhelming popular
sentiment against the communists simply could not have gone
unobserved by the Justices. The tone of the plurality arguably
evidences its own anti-communist hysteria in its repeated referenc-
es to petitioners' "highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly
disciplined members subject to call,"63 even though all indicators
showed that the Communist Party had a relatively weak hold in
the United States.' Such sentiment, combined with the plural-
ity's perversion of the "clear and present danger" test and the
surrounding social context, led scholars of the Court to agree with
the dissenting Justices regarding the role of anti-communist
hysteria in the decision. As one scholar noted,
the history of the McCarthy period was part of the
provenience of the decision in Dennis v. United
States-as were also the investigations by the House
6 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-71 873 (1972). Indeed,
communists were so unpopular that the ACLU refused to follow through on a promise to
defend the eleven Dennis defendants at trial and worked heartily to disassociate itself from
them. BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 212. At least one member of the ACLU during this period
claims that anti-communist sentiment caused the organization to "compromisen on many
basic issues and often [take] an apologetic attitude in defending the Bill of Rights." CORLISS
LAMONT, YES TO LIFE 136-37 (1981).
62 BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 44.
' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511; see also id. at 509. Justice Frankfurter's
calmer concurring opinion also referred to contemporaneous events in support of his claim
that Congress was reasonable in finding the Communist Party to be a substantial threat.
Id. at 547-48 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Even President Truman, who issued the executive order regarding loyalty oaths, never
believed that the Communist Party in the United States posed much of a threat, instead
dismissing it as "a contemptible minority in a land of freedom." BELKNAP, supra note 3, at
44. However, he apparently encouraged "acceptance of the notion that American
Communists must be extremely dangerous" in order to advance opposition to Soviet
expansion elsewhere. Id. at 45; see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If
we are to take judicial notice of the threat of Communists within the nation, it should not
be difficult to conclude that as a political party they are of little consequence." (emphasis in
original)).
[Vol. 33:1
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Committee on Un-American Activities, the Cham-
bers-Hiss drama and the conviction of Alger Hiss,
and the tensions of the Cold War. It is difficult to
believe that this complex of events had no bearing on
how ... Chief Justice Vinson resolved the issue of
the clear-and-present-danger test.65
B. BACKING AWAY FROM DENNIS: YATES V. UNITED STATES
Justice Black, dissenting in Dennis, expressed the hope that "in
calmer times, ... this or some later Court will restore the First
Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong
in a free society."6' Such times did not come soon. After Dennis,
the government prosecuted communists in earnest. Between 1951
and 1956, the Justice Department charged at least 126 communists
with violations of the Smith Act.6" Most defendants were convict-
ed and their convictions were universally affirmed by appellate
courts;6" the Supreme Court essentially abstained from involve-
ment in such cases.69 Yet over the course of this period, many of
the events that led to anti-communist hysteria in the early 1950s
began to reverse themselves. In 1953 the Korean War ended after
a lengthy negotiated settlement.70 In that same year, tensions
with the Soviet Union eased after the death of Joseph Stalin.7
' KONvrrz, supra note 56, at 122; see also KALVEN, supra note 2, at 190-91 (stating that
the Dennis Court "acknowledge[d] clear and present danger as the constitutional measure
of free speech, but in the process, to meet the political exigencies of the case, ... officially
adjustled] the test").
"3 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581.
67 BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 156-57.
" Id. at 158; Robert Mollan, Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates
Decisions, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 705, 710-16, 723 (1965) (discussing specific convictions and
subsequent history).
69 Mollan, supra note 68, at 723 ("[I1n none of these cases did the Supreme Court, prior
to Yates, seriously question the results reached by the lower courts as to first amendment
claims.").
" Lindesay Parrott, Ceremony is Brief- Halt in 3-Year Conflict for a Political Parley Due
at 9 A.M. Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1953, at 1; Lindesay Parrott, Truce Unit Meets:
Enemy Chiefs Complete Signing-Copies of Accord Exchanged, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1953, at
1.
71 See Harrison E. Salisbury, Premier Ill 4 Days: Announcement of Death Made by Top
Soviet and Party Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1953, at 1; see also BELKNAP, supra note 3, at
213 ("On the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, where Joseph Stalin had died a few months
earlier, the new Russian leadership evidenced a belief in the possibility of peacefully
1998]
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By 1955, the Soviets agreed to negotiate with the United States
regarding ending the Cold War and further agreed to sign a peace
treaty setting up such negotiations." Perhaps most importantly,
Senator McCarthy's influence began to wane. Once considered a
national hero, a public confrontation with the Department of the
Army in 1954"3 eventually "exposed him ... as a crude and
vicious demagogue." 4 In December of 1954, the Senate voted to
censure McCarthy-an exceedingly rare action on its part.75
McCarthy never recovered. His popularity, which reached an all-
time high in 1953, eventually plummeted and McCarthyism
gradually died out.76
It appears that Justice Black's "calmer times" were approaching
as the decade of the 1950s passed. This is not to say that anti-
communism was dead; in fact, much anti-communist sentiment
existed well into the next decade. But the easing tensions and fall
of McCarthyism apparently led to a decline in hysteria and a re-
evaluation of subversive activity. 7 During this period, at least a
few of the Justices expressed unhappiness with the government's
pursuit of communists and lower court complicity therein. 8 Thus,
in 1955 the Court agreed to hear Yates v. United States, and in
resolving that country's differences with the United States. .
72 BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 213-14.
7' For a general description of such events see FRIED, supra note 51, at 178-81; TUcK,
supra note 59, at 135-39. McCarthy's run-ins with the Army eventually sparked the Senate
to hold hearings regarding his conduct. See generally Special Senate Investigation on
Charges and Countercharges Involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn, and Francis P. Carr
before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 83d
Cong. (1954).
7" BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 215.
76 S. Res. 301, 83d Cong., 100 CONG. REC. 16392 (1954).
76 In 1953, 50% of Americans held a favorable opinion of Senator McCarthy while only
29% held an unfavorable view of him. His popularity fell steadily so that by mid-1954 only
36% of the public reacted favorably to him while 51% viewed him unfavorably. See GALLUP,
supra note 61, at 1201, 1220, 1225, 1237, 1241 and 1263.77 BELKNAP, supra note 3, at 215 ("The fall of McCarthy did not put an end to everything
connoted by the term 'McCarthyism,' but it did indicate that the times were changing.").
78 Id. at 245 (noting that Justices Harlan and Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren were
especially concerned with "the excesses of the anti-communist crusade"); KONVrrZ, supra note
56, at 126 ("One can only conjecture as to why the Court acted as it did in the Yates case.
[But after] an endless series of prosecutions of Communists... [it may have seen that the]
clear and present danger was not the Communist conspiracy against the government, but
the Communist conspiracy cases, in their threat to the integrity of the First Amendment.").
[Vol. 33:1
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1957 the Yates Court issued a ruling that substantially curtailed
Dennis's reach. 9
Yates presented the Court with a scenario almost identical to
Dennis. Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party stood accused of
conspiring to advocate the forcible overthrow of the government,
with the conspiracy taking the form of "writ[ing] and publish[ing]
... articles on the proscribed advocacy and teaching" and "con-
duct[ing] schools for the indoctrination of Party members in such
advocacy and teaching."" In fact, the charges and evidence in
both cases were so similar that Justice Clark characterized the
Yates defendants as "engaged in this conspiracy with the [Dennis]
defendants,... serv[ing] in the same army and engag[ing] in the
same mission."8' Nevertheless, the Yates Court reversed all of the
defendants' convictions. It did so not by overruling the obviously
applicable principles of Dennis; Justice Harlan's lead opinion never
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test. Instead, Justice
Harlan focused on the lower court's jury instruction,82 holding, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, that it did not comport with
the requirements of the Smith Act. According to Justice Harlan,
the instruction implied that the Act "prohibit[ed] advocacy and
teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced
from any effort to instigate action to that end, so long as such
advocacy or teaching [was] engaged in with evil intent."83 The
instruction's failure to acknowledge that the Act required some
form of incitement to action rendered it fatally flawed. Justice
Harlan also reviewed the evidence supporting the conviction and
pronounced that the record was insufficient to establish the
required incitement; he further ordered the lower court to enter
acquittals for five of the defendants and to grant new trials for the
remaining nine defendants.8
" Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); overruled in part by Bucks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
go Id. at 301-02 (citing to petitioners' indictment).
8
'
1 d. at 344-45 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Dennis defendants were named as unindicted
co-conspirators in Yates. Id. at 344.
82 Id. at 313-14 n.18 (setting forth relevant portions of trial court's jury instruction).
' Id. at 318. In explaining his distinction between advocacy of action and advocacy of
doctrine, Justice Harlan noted that the Court 'need not... decide the issue.., in terms of
constitutional compulsion, for our first duty is to construe this statute. In doing so, we
should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly
marked." Id. at 319.
4 Id. at 327-35.
19981
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ga. L. Rev. 17 1998-1999
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Justice Harlan's decision contrasts significantly with Chief
Justice Vinson's opinion in Dennis. Vinson was never concerned
with incitement to action; he instead found that the danger posed
by a conspiracy to advocate the use of violence, even absent
incitement, was sufficient to justify conviction of the defendants.'
In addition, Chief Justice Vinson specifically refused to review any
evidence, thereby rendering his decision relatively abstract.86
Harlan's reading of the Smith Act, on the other hand, deliberately
placed significant evidentiary hurdles in the prosecutor's path even
though the evidence in both cases was essentially similar.8"
Justice Harlan's actions led most scholars to believe that he
"effect[ed] a bloodless revolution" against Dennis without actually
overruling it.88 As Professor Gunther noted,
Harlan found a way to curtail prosecutions under the
Smith Act even though the constitutionality of the
Act had been sustained in Dennis. He did it by...
[reading] the statute in terms of constitutional
presuppositions; and he strove to find standards
"manageable" by judges and capable of curbing jury
discretion. He insisted on strict statutory standards
of proof emphasizing the actual speech of the [defen-
dants] .... Harlan claimed to be interpreting
Dennis. In fact, [Yates] represented doctrinal evolu-
tion in a new direction .... 89
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951) ("It is the existence of the
conspiracy which creates the danger.").
" Id. at 497 (noting that "limited grant of the writ of certiorari has removed from our
consideration any question as to the sufficiency of the evidence"); see also KALVEN, supra note
2, at 194 ("As a consequence of this move, the justices [were] cut off from the political
realities of the speech they [were] adjudicating, and we get a curiously abstract discussion
of the limits of political dissent.").
' As Professor Kalven noted, "[in view of the fact that the trial in Dennis was completed
in 1949 and the indictment in Yates was handed down in 1951, it is difficult to believe that
the prosecution in Yates did not have access to the best evidence used in Dennis.
Accordingly, the Court's response to the quality of proof in Yates must also be read as a
commentary on the quality of proof in Dennis." KALVEN, supra note 2, at 195.
8Id. at 214.
" Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719,753 (1975); see also CAUTE, supra note 53,
at 208 (noting that Yates "effectively revers[ed] the seminal ruling of the Vinson Court in the
[Vol. 33:1
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The social and political context in which Dennis and Yates occurred
are critical to understanding the outcome of each opinion and the
claims of later scholars that the Court essentially engaged in
political decisionmaking. The protestors in Madsen and Schenck
make similar claims. Thus, the following sections review both
Madsen and Schenck, as well as the political and social context in
which they arose in order to examine the potential parallels to
Dennis and Yates.
II. MADSEN V. WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER, INC.
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Madsen arose from the efforts of Operation Rescue to shut down
the Women's Health Center in Melbourne, Florida.90 As part of
those efforts, members of Operation Rescue and their supporters
demonstrated outside of the clinic and engaged in other conduct,
including blocking access to the clinic, abusing persons entering
and leaving the clinic, and trespassing on clinic grounds. As these
activities became increasingly disruptive, the clinic sought and
received a temporary injunction barring Operation Rescue's
members from engaging in violent and intrusive conduct outside of
the clinic."1 After a lengthy hearing, the trial court concluded that
its initial injunction proved insufficient "to protect the health,
safety and rights of women ... seeking access to [medical and
counseling services]. "92 Specifically, the court found that the
Dennis case, which had opened the door to the legal persecution of the communist party");
KONVITZ, supra note 56, at 126 ("The Court could not, in 1957, overrule the Dennis decision
.... [S]o it acted to leave the statute and its earlier decision intact but pulled their teeth.").
0 During the course of the lawsuit, all parties agreed that Operation Rescue's "desire was
to close down 'abortion mills' by various means" and specifically that it desired "to close down
abortion clinics in the Central Florida area." Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
626 So. 2d 664, 667 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (citing parties' stipulated facts), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nor. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
91 The Florida trial court enjoined Operation Rescue members from blocking access to the
clinic, physically abusing persons entering, leaving or otherwise connected with the clinic,
or inciting such actions by others. Id. at 667 n.4. The trial court's order also specifically
noted that it "should [not] be construed to limit Respondents' exercise of their legitimate
First Amendment rights, such as, but not limited to, carrying signs, singing, and praying,
in a manner which does not violate" other provisions of the injunction. Id,
92 Id. at 667.
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protestors continued to block access to the clinic, continually
jammed the telephone system of the clinic, provided literature
identifying the staff of the clinic as "baby killers," followed doctors
and pretended to shoot them from adjacent vehicles, stalked clinic
staff, and forced those seeking the services of the clinic to "run a
gauntlet" of protestors shouting epithets and personal abuse.93 In
light of the protestors' continued actions, the trial court amended
its original injunction to include not only bans on certain conduct
but on some expressive activity as well. The new injunction thus
added provisions prohibiting Operation Rescue from (1) congregat-
ing or demonstrating within thirty-six feet of the property line of
the clinic, (2) shouting, chanting, singing, or using noise amplifica-
tion equipment or observable images within earshot of clinic
patients during the clinic's surgical hours, (3) physically approach-
ing, within 300 feet of the clinic, any person seeking the services of
the clinic unless that person manifested consent to be approached,
and (4) demonstrating, congregating, or using sound amplification
equipment within 300 feet of the residence of any clinic employ-
ee.
94
The amended injunction produced mixed results at the appellate
level. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the lower court's
decision and found the injunction to be a neutral, necessary, and
reasonably tailored regulation of speech. 95 Almost simultaneously,
a federal appellate court, hearing a separate challenge to the same
injunction, held that it was impermissibly viewpoint-based in
violation of the First Amendment.96 The United States Supreme
Court granted Operation Rescue's petition for a writ of certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict.
93 Id. at 667-69.
" Id. at 669.
9Id. at 671-74.
"See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 710-12 (11th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff in Cheffer
sought an order in federal district court blocking enforcement of the state court injunction,
claiming that it "acted as a prior restraint on her free speech rights, and that the threat of
arrest chilled her ability to exercise those rights." Id. at 707-08. The federal district court
refused to stay the state court order but the federal appellate court ordered the district court
to reconsider its refusal and to examine further the constitutionality of the injunction. Id.
at 712.
[Vol. 33:1
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Before the Supreme Court, Operation Rescue attempted to cast
the injunction as impermissibly viewpoint-based 97 and as a, prior
restraint,9" characterizations that, if successful, almost certainly
would have resulted in its demise. 9  The Court dismissed the
prior restraint argument in a single footnote 0 but devoted some
attention to the viewpoint-discrimination argument. While
acknowledging that the injunction affected only anti-abortion
protestors, the majority rejected the petitioners' argument that it
was therefore necessarily viewpoint-based. Rather, because the
injunction was issued as a result of "the group's past actions in the
context of a specific dispute between real parties" and not with
reference to the protestors' message, the Court ruled it to be
content-neutral.'' Recognizing, however, that even content-
neutral injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship and discrimi-
natory application than do general ordinances,"1°2 the Court
deemed it necessary to apply a new, slightly higher standard of
review than it typically used for content-neutral regulations of
speech. The majority thus held that such injunctions were
constitutional only if they "burden[ed] no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest."0 3
The majority spent the remainder of its opinion applying this
standard, with mixed results. It easily found the government
7 Brief for Petitioners at 8-20, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)
(No. 93-880).
Id. at 37-43.
The Court views regulations which prohibit citizens from expressing a particular point
of view with particular disfavor and rarely, if ever, upholds them. See, e.g., RA.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). The Court has an equal if not greater antipathy
toward prior restraints (i.e., government attempts to suppress expression prior to its
dissemination). Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
"00 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 756, 763 n.2 (1994). Although
admitting that "[p]rior restraints do often take the form of injunctions," the majority refused
to find that "all injunctions which may incidentally affect expression ... are 'prior
restraints.'" Id. Because the Madsen injunction was neither content-based nor wholly
suppressive of speech, it did not fall into the prior restraint category. Id.1o0 Id. at 762-64.
2 Id. at 764.
103 Id. at 765. The Court judges content-neutral standards by asking if they "are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech .... are narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest .... and leave open ample alternatives for communica-
tion of information." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984).
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interests-protecting women's freedom to seek lawful medical or
counseling services regarding their pregnancies, ensuring public
safety and order, and protecting medical privacy-to be signifi-
cant.10 4 The question for the Court then became simply whether
the various provisions of the injunction were sufficiently tailored to
meet those interests. The Court held that the thirty-six-foot buffer
zone was constitutional,' 5 noting that the protestors' repeated
interference with access to the clinic left the lower court with few
options regarding protection of its state interests.' 6 That peti-
tioners did not merely protest abortion but actually engaged in
"focused picketing" aimed directly at clinic patients and staff
further bolstered the majority's conclusion."' Presumably, such
focused picketing was too intrusive on the privacy interests of
unwilling listeners who were "captive" in the medical facility.' 8
The privacy interests of patients also spurred the Court to uphold
a provision of the injunction prohibiting high noise levels near the
clinic. ' 9 On the other hand, the Court struck down the "images
observable" portion of this provision, noting that the clinic could
simply pull its curtains to keep such images out. Though potential-
ly offensive, the images represented a much less significant
invasion of privacy than high noise levels."0 Finally, the Court
found the 300-foot "no approach" zone unconstitutional. Although
that provision was designed to prevent stalking and harassment,
its prohibition on even "peaceful, uninvited approaches" violated
'4 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-68.
" Id. at 768-70. While upholding this provision as applied to public property, the Court
struck down the buffer zone to the extent it entered private property, noting that there was
insufficient evidence that the protesters used such property to express their message. Id.
at 771.106 Id. at 769.
107 Id.
" Id. The Court alluded to its decision in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), where
it upheld an ordinance banning focused picketing of residences based upon a strong interest
in residential privacy. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769. The Madsen Court struck down a provision
of the injunction banning protestors from demonstrating within 300 feet of the residence of
any clinic staff though the Court noted that it might have upheld a provision more directly
aimed at preventing "focused picketing." Id. at 775. The size of the zone, however,
precluded any conclusion that the provision applied only to focused picketing. Id.
10" Id. at 772-73 (noting that "First Amendment does not demand that patients at a
medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests").
"0 Id. at 773.
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the Court's longstanding principle that "in public debate our own
citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous speech in
order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protect-
ed by the First Amendment.""' Absent evidence that speech was
independently proscribable or suffused with violence (as opposed to
merely offensive), the "no approach" zone was overly broad." 2
The Court's decision was far from unanimous. Justice Stevens
dissented, arguing that a content-neutral injunction should be
reviewed under a more lenient standard than a content-neutral
ordinance because such injunctions do not apply to the community
as a whole but only to those engaged in wrongdoing." 3  In
contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
argued that an injunction against a single group with shared views
was at least as deserving of strict scrutiny as an explicitly content-
based or viewpoint-based ordinance, primarily because such
injunctions (1) readily lend themselves to suppression of particular
ideas, (2) are the product of individual judges rather than legisla-
tures, and (3) are a more powerful weapon than criminal penal-
ties."' Arguing that "an injunction against speech [was] the very
prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, the
prior restraint," Justice Scalia further chastised the majority for
ignoring a substantial body of past precedent in which the Court
"repeatedly struck down speech-restricting injunctions.""'
Indeed, Justice Scalia believed the majority's departure from First
Amendment law to be so egregious that he flatly accused them of
bowing to abortion politics:
.. Id. at 774 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
further would have upheld the 300-foot no approach zone as consistent with the First
Amendment, primarily because the ban on "physically approaching" was at best a ban on
mixed conduct and speech rather than pure speech. Id. at 780-82. Given earlier findings
that protestors' conduct caused "higher levels of'anxiety and hypertension' "in patients, thus
increasing their medical risks, Justice Stevens found a ban on physical approaches
imminently reasonable. Id. at 781.
"' Id. at 792-96 (Scalia J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia argued that this particular injunction was actually aimed at suppressing a
particular point of view. Id. at 792-93.
"' Id. at 797 (citing this body of precedent).
19981
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The entire injunction in this case departs so far from
the established course of our jurisprudence that in
any other context it would have been regarded as a
candidate for summary reversal. But the context
here is abortion .... Today the ad hoc nullification
machine [of abortion] claims its latest, greatest, and
most surprising victim: the First Amendment.
116
B. PROTESTOR RESPONSE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: PARALLELS TO
DENNIS
Anti-abortion protestors and their supporters reacted to Madsen
almost immediately. Prompted by the Court's new standard of
review and its willingness to uphold any aspect of the injunction,
the petitioners' attorney claimed that "[tihe court's decision today
has retreated to the dark ages, when speech was permitted only at
the discretion of government officials."" 7 Echoing Justice Scalia's
dissent, one of the petitioners declared that "[i]f I were pro-choice,
I would be allowed to say anything, anywhere .... But as a pro-
lifer, my rights have been trampled on."" 8 Of course, such
declarations are largely political tactics designed to arouse public
sympathy."9 They do not indicate that the Court actually acted
based upon political motivations as it apparently did in Dennis.
The danger in Madsen, however, is that the political and social
context in which it arose lends an aura of credibility to the
protestors' claims of political persecution.
116 Id. at 785.
n Andrea D. Greene, Local Clinics Applaud High Court's Ruling on Abortion Protests,
HOUS. CHRON., July 1, 1994, at 32 (quoting plaintiff's attorney, Mat Stayer); see also Anthony
Flint, Some Say Law Too Harsh on Abortion Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 8
("[C]hampions of free speech argue that abortion foes have been singled out for harsh legal
treatment by liberals.").
118 Crawford, supra note 13, at Al (quoting petitioner Judy Madsen).
n As Professor Fish has noted, people frequently manipulate notions of free speech in
order to advance political agendas:
"Free speech" is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the
substantive agendas we wish to advance; and we give our preferred
verbal behaviors that name when we can, when we have the power to do
so, because in the rhetoric of American life, the label "free speech" is the
one you want your favorites to wear. Free speech, in short, is not an
independent value but a political prize.
STANLEY E. FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 102 (1994).
[Vol. 33:1
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As with the communists in Dennis, anti-abortion protestors were
a largely unpopular group at the time of the Madsen decision-an
unpopularity that was twenty years in the making. Galvanized by
the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 decision constitutionalizing a
woman's right to choose abortion, 2 ° anti-abortion forces mounted
a huge campaign to reverse its effects.u1 The movement initially
focused on public education and political channels, engaging in
tactics such as deluging the Supreme Court with protest letters,
persuading legislators to introduce human life amendments, calling
for civil disobedience against the Court's decisions, and flooding the
court system with litigation. 22 Despite their widespread political
efforts, the anti-abortion movement in these early years was largely
unsuccessful. Although some legislatures passed laws significantly
restricting women's access to abortion, the Supreme Court struck
down almost all of them. 21 Moreover, the movement was unsuc-
... Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121 An organized anti-abortion movement appeared in the 1960s as states began to
liberalize their laws restricting abortion. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS
OF MOTHERHOOD 127-37 (1984) (discussing anti-abortion movement prior to Roe). The rapid
and significant change effected by Roe appears to have turned the nascent movement into
a cohesive political force. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND
THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 28 (1994) (noting that [c]oncerted opposition to abortion
beyond the state level did not develop until shortly after" Roe); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 143 (1990) ("Roe precipitated the real rise in the
Catholic right-to-life movement.").
1
' BLANCHARD, supra note 121, at 32-33 (discussing letter-writing campaign and human
rights amendments); DENNIS J. HORAN, ET AL., ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 185-215 (1987) (generally discussing anti-
abortion movement's use of litigation as strategic maneuver); TRIBE, supra note 121, at 143
(discussing call for civil disobedience and Catholic Church's pressure on members to oppose
the abortion right).
1" With the exceptions of restrictions on abortion funding, see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), and regulations regarding minors seeking to obtain abortions, see, e.g., H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Court struck down most regulations of abortion
procedures as violative of a woman's due process right. See Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 748 (1986) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional statutory provisions requiring that women be advised of available medical assistance
and of the "detrimental physical and psychological effects" of abortion, and that father be
held responsible for financial assistance), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Roprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 417 (1983)
(striking down statutory provisions (1) making blanket determination that all minors under
age of 15 are too immature to make abortion decision and (2) requiring provision of lengthy
and inflexible list of information to abortion candidate), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833;
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a Missouri
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cessful in reducing the number of abortions'24 or in significantly
changing public opinion regarding the abortion right."
Becoming increasingly frustrated with these failures, anti-
abortion forces began to focus on picketing and demonstrations in
order to influence public opinion. These early (and largely
peaceful) picketing efforts were also seemingly unhelpful to the
anti-abortion cause.'26 Thus, protestors increasingly relied upon
disruptive and often violent tactics in order to discourage women
from obtaining abortions. From 1977 to 1993, over 1000 acts of
violence were committed against abortion clinics, including
bombings and arsons, death threats and assaults, hundreds of clinic
127 sevrainvasions, and several murders or attempted murders. 28  In
that same period, anti-abortion protestors engaged in at least 6000
clinic blockades and related disruptions. 129  The protests in
statute requiring abortion after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in hospital); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 53 (1976) (holding "a blanket parental consent
requirement" to be unconstitutional).
'2 BLANCHARD, supra note 121, at 54 ("Despite the efforts of [anti-abortion] groups, the
number of abortions performed remained fairly constant at about 1.5 million per year.").
125 Id. at 53; MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 41 (1987).
16 BLANCHARD, supra note 121, at 53 ("As the picketing alone seemed to have little effect,
many groups became more hostile and more assertive").
'2 S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 3 (1993) (Senate Report from the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources related to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (noting that 36
bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, 2 kidnappings, and 327 clinic invasions
took place between 1977 and April 1993)); see also Tara K. Kelly, Silencing the Lambs:
Restricting the First Amendment Rights of Abortion Clinic Protestors in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 427, 434-37 (1995) (discussing violent tactics used by
abortion protestors). As early as 1985, 88% of the non-hospital facilities performing at least
400 abortions per year (i.e., facilities performing 75% of all abortions) experienced some type
of harassment. Janice Mall, About Women: Harassment of Abortion Clinics Growing, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1987, pt. 6, at 8.
12 In March of 1993, Dr. David Gunn, a physician who performed abortions, was shot and
killed during an anti-abortion demonstration. S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 3 (1993). In August
of that year, Rachelle Shannon attempted to kill an abortion physician in Wichita, Kansas.
Robert Davis, Suspect Praised Earlier Abortion Shooting, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1993, at A3.
Dr. George Patterson was killed in September, 1993 in Mobile, Alabama, and police
suspected the culprit was a person opposed to his abortion work. Id. In the summer of 1994,
Dr. John Bayard Britton and a volunteer escort were fatally shot by an abortion opponent
in Pensacola, Florida. Henry Chu & Mike Clary, Doctor, Volunteer Slain Outside Abortion
Clinic, L-A. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at Al. In December of 1994, John Salvi shot and killed
two women in abortion clinics in Massachusetts. Elizabeth Mehren & John J. Goodman, 2
Killed, 5 Wounded in Shootings at 2 Abortion Clinics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
129 S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 3 (1993).
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Madsen, then, were merely a small aspect of"a deliberate campaign
to eliminate access [to abortion services] by closing clinics and
intimidating doctors" across America. 3 °
Given the breadth and increasingly violent nature of their
activity, the backlash against the protestors was almost inevitable.
The public increasingly decried the actions of anti-abortion "zealots"
and accused the protestors of engaging in guerilla warfare.131
Polls showed that the majority of people strongly disapproved of
anti-abortion protestors' tactics3 2 and also favored restrictions on
their rights. 33 Law enforcement officials had similarly short
fuses with the protestors. Thus, as one researcher notes, "[wihere
activities such as those of Operation Rescue [were] prolonged and
vituperative, there [was] a tendency for local law enforcement
officials to grow weary and to escalate the punishments meted
out."134  Cities also enacted ordinances with heightened punish-
ments for persons "trespassing on the grounds of medical facili-
ties," 35  ordinances specifically banning focused picketing, 36
130 Id. at 11.
131 Newspapers in the period preceding Madsen were rife with anti-protestor editorials,
including several references to protestors as "zealots," "fanatics," "militants," and "terrorists."
See, e.g., Abortion Clinics Need Protection, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 24, 1993, at
A10 (applauding federal law eliminating anti-abortion protest measures that amount to "raw
intimidation of women"); Abortion Fanatic Tactics are Turning Public against Pro-Life
Protestors' Cause, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 13, 1993, at A6 (referring to anti-abortion
protestors as "fanatics" and "zealots"); Brian L. Finkel, "Bubble" Column Shows Myopia of
a Zealot, Absolutism of a Despot, ARIZ. REPUBLIc, Dec. 1, 1993, at B8 (referring to columnist
who decried implementation of "safety zone" restriction as having the "myopia of a zealot");
Fortify Abortion Rights-Enact U.S. Law Against Violence, Intimidation, BUFF. NEWS, July
5, 1993, at B2 (referring to actions taken by Operation Rescue "zealots" in Buffalo and
Amherst, Massachusetts); Protect Access to Clinics, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1993, at 14A
(calling certain actions of anti-abortion protesters an "unbridled reign of terror").
12 A 1991 Gallup poll taken during the blockade of clinics in Wichita, Kansas revealed
that 77% of those polled disapproved of the anti-abortion protestors' tactics. Larry Hugick,
'Pro-Life" Wichita Demonstrations Fail to Change Opinion on Abortion, THE GALLuP POLL
MONTHLY, Sept. 1991, at 49.
1" See, e.g., Sound Off-Most Callers Favor Court Restricting Abortion Protesters,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 1994, at A9 (noting that 2,237 of 3,861 people responding to poll
favored Supreme Court restrictions on abortion protestors).
134 BLANCHARD, supra note 121, at 92.
"35 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Public Affairs Action Letter 4 (June 5,
1992) (noting city of Cincinnati's enactment of mandatory jail sentences for such persons).
'
3 In 1985, as a direct response to anti-abortion protests outside of an abortion provider's
residence, the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin enacted an ordinance prohibiting all "picketing
before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield." Frisby
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and ordinances imposing criminal penalties upon protestors who
refused to remain a certain distance away from clinics. 3 7  Even
the federal government joined the rush to regulate abortion
protestors, enacting the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1993, which prohibits the use of force or threat of force to
"intentionally injure[], intimidate[], or interfere[]" with a person
attempting to obtain reproductive services.' 3
In addition, clinics and other abortion providers successfully
enlisted the court system in their fight against the protestors'
activities. Thus, clinics convinced some courts to impose massive
fines against protestors under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), a federal statute designed to
prevent patterns of racketeering activity.' 9 Eventually, even the
Supreme Court weighed in against the protestors by upholding the
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,477 (1987). The Supreme Court eventually upheld the constitution.
ality of the ordinance. Id. at 488.
" The city of Boulder, Colorado, for example, enacted an ordinance prohibiting anyone
leafleting or protesting on public property within 100 feet of any health care facility from
"approach[ing] closer than eight feet from [the person they sought to influence], unless such
[person gave] express oral consent to do so." Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting
Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 1857 n.12 (1988). The city of Phoenix,
Arizona enacted a similar ordinance. See Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169, 1170 (9th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1077 (1997) (mem.).
13 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994). Although the Act speaks broadly in terms of'reproduc.
live services," there is no question that it is aimed primarily at reversing problems caused
by anti-abortion protestors. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3-33 (1993) (discussing Act's
necessity in light of history of violence and disruption caused by anti-abortion protestors).
'
39 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994). Abortion clinics and their supporters successfully
argued that the anti-abortion protestors' disruptive actions were part of a "nationwide
conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including
extortion" in violation of§ 1962(c). National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,253
(1994); see also Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
According to the clinics, the protestors "conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence,
or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up their jobs, give up their
economic right to practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical services at the
clinics." Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 253. As a result of such lawsuits, anti-abortion groups
incurred massive fines, some totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. See BLANCHARD,
supra note 121, at 66, 94; Jan Crawford, Abortion Protestors Hit Legal Roadblock, CHu. TRaB.,
Jan. 25, 1994, at 1 (noting that fines in RICO lawsuit against protestors could exceed $1
million).
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use of RICO against them, 4 ° although some of the justices ex-
pressed concern over the potential infringement on protestors' free
speech rights.' In addition to seeking monetary awards, several
clinics sought court orders enjoining protestors from engaging in
violent and disruptive actions at clinics. Such lawsuits were
largely successful in obtaining injunctions prohibiting violent and
intimidating behavior and clinic blockades,' an unsurprising
result given that invasive conduct such as trespass, vandalism and
harassment are paradigm bases for injunctive relief. More
importantly, however, clinics were able to persuade a number of
courts to extend their injunctions to arguably peaceful anti-abortion
protests, prohibiting, for example, even peaceful demonstrations or
counseling within certain distances of clinic property.' As
discussed above, Madsen fell into this category of cases.
Such was the position of the anti-abortion protestors as Madsen
reached the Supreme Court. That is, at least one of the parties
before the Court in Madsen was a very public organization against
1  Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 262. In Scheidler, the Court ruled that no economic motive was
required in order to use RICO against an organization otherwise falling within its
parameters. Id. at 257. As a result, RICO remained available as a weapon against anti-
abortion protestors even though they were political opponents, as opposed to commercial
competitors, of the clinics. Scheidler's impact in this area is unclear, however, because of
anti-abortion organizations' tendency to hide assets in the personal accounts of their
members, see Karen Tumulty & Lynn Smith, Operation Rescue: Soldier in a "Holy War" on
Abortion, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1989, at 1, or to dissolve and reorganize as new groups, see
BLANCHARD, supra note 121, at 66, making it difficult to enforce collection of the fines.
Nevertheless, juries are still finding against protestors charged with RICO violations. See
David E. Rovella, NOW Abortion Victory Assailed, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at A6 (noting
recent jury verdict imposing RICO fines on abortion protestors).
14 See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 265 (Souter, J., concurring) ("I think it prudent to notice
that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy and to caution courts applying RICO to
bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at stake.").
.4. See, e.g., New York State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1363-64 (2d
Cir. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681,
684, 687 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo v. Holy Angels Catholic
Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v.
Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1990); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felcissimo, 638 A.2d
1260 (N.J. 1994); Options v. Lawson, 670 A.2d 1081, 1082, 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996).
14 See, e.g., Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 859 F.2d at 684 (enjoining
demonstrations and distribution of literature); Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp.
at 626 (prohibiting protestors from counseling and distributing literature); Horizon Health
Ctr., 638 A.2d at 1264-65 (holding court had authority to enjoin "peaceful expressive
activities"); Options, 670 A.2d at 1082, 1087 (same).
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which there was substantial public outcry and antipathy and
against which numerous legislatures and judges had acted. This
did not mean that the protestors were wholly without support in
their beliefs. During this period at least fourteen percent of
Americans believed that abortion should be completely outlawed
while another forty-nine percent believed that it should be restrict-
ed in certain circumstances.'" Furthermore, during the 1980s
the President of the United States maintained substantial support
for the anti-abortion cause.'45 Although the Supreme Court never
went as far as overruling Roe, its rulings in the late 1980s and
early 1990s generally upheld significant restrictions on the abortion
right.4 ' Nevertheless, abortion protestors (as opposed to abortion
policy) were under attack'47 by the early 1990s, thus fueling their
outcry when the Court used an admittedly new standard to uphold
the injunction against them.
144 Hugick, supra note 132, at 49.
'
45 See TRIBE, supra note 121, at 161 (stating that after election of Ronald Reagan in 1980
"the pro-life movement had an avowed believer in the White House"). George Bush, who was
elected President in 1988, also advanced the pro-life agenda while in office, supporting, for
example, restrictive regulations on abortion counseling by recipients of federal funds. See
Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of
Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1727-28 (1995)
(discussing federal regulations in force during Bush administration).
146 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1989), a plurality of
the Supreme Court argued that Roe should be overturned. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
192-93 (1991), a majority of the Court upheld viewpoint-based restrictions on abortion
counseling at clinics which received federal subsidies. And in its most recent decision,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992) (joint opinion), the Court, while
reaffirming the "essential holding" of Roe, appears to have at least impliedly acknowledged
that the abortion right no longer has fundamental status. See also Wells, supra note 145,
at 1755-58 (discussing how Casey Court diminished status of abortion right).
14" This aspect of the abortion protest cases differs somewhat from the communist cases.
Popular opposition to communists in the early and mid-20th century was closely entwined
with opposition to their message. In contrast, many people support the anti-abortion
platform although they oppose the protestors. Hugick, supra note 132, at 49 (discussing
1991 Gallup poll that revealed that 57% of those persons who favored repealing Roe
nevertheless condemned protestors' behavior). Such a response is due less to viewpoint
discrimination than to the generally held view that "collective [protest] ... behavior [is]
irrational, fickle, violent, undirected, and contagious." C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned
Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78
Nw. U. L. REv. 937,981 (1983); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 14-
15 (1969) (discussing unpopularity of various protest movements). Nevertheless, both the
communist and anti-abortion decisions arose in the midst of great antipathy toward speakers
involved in controversial issues, thus lending credence to the speakers' claims that they were
sacrificed for political reasons.
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Further aiding the protestors was the fact that the issue before
the Madsen Court was not merely freedom of expression, but
freedom of expression about abortion. As a citizenry, the abortion
issue has consumed us: "We cannot stop legislating and adjudicat-
ing about it, or talking and writing about it, or imagining and even
imaging it. Much like slavery before it, abortion has become an
epic controversy in which the very soul of our disquiet republic
seems capable of bursting."4 ' To discuss "freedom of speech" in
such a context is dangerous stuff, as evidenced by the frequency
with which the abortion issue infected the discussion regarding
protestors' rights. For example, those arguing in favor of injunc-
tions frequently characterized the question as whether free speech
rights or abortion rights should prevail,'49 even though the
injunction in Madsen had implications well beyond the abortion
context. 5 ' Such arguments could only fuel the Madsen protes-
tors' claim that the emotional issue of abortion-as opposed to
sound legal principles-was the real catalyst of the Court's decision.
It may also have influenced even neutral observers' conclusions
that Madsen somehow represented a loss of civil liberties.'5 ' In
this sense, Madsen does parallel Dennis on at least some level.
After Madsen, then, the logical question was whether the Court
would stick by its new standard or would back away from its
arguably political decision, just as the Yates Court eventually
148 Jane Maslow Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J.
1235, 1236 (1989) (reviewing GLENDON, supra note 125).
149 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests-Section
11, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1198-1200 (1996) (discussing difficulty of finding balance
between free speech rights and abortion rights); Kelly, supra note 127, at 448-58 (same).
1" At least some commentators noted that Madsen's decision to uphold portions of the
injunction had significant implications for all protestors. See, e.g., Sean Patrick O'Rourke
& Ron Manuto, Buffer Zone Protects a Basic Right... But Does It Rob Us of Another One?,
Cm. TRm., July 28, 1994, at 19 ("[T]he Madsen opinion may indicate a new willingness to
limit the place and manner in which protest may occur."); Jerry Zremski, High Court's
Ruling Gives Judges More Power to Curb Protests, BUFF. NEWS, July 1, 1994, at A9 (noting
that Madsen may have effect on "labor unions, animal-rights demonstrators and anyone else
who might ever want to protest"); see also Darrin Alan Hostetler, Comment, Face-to-Face
with the First Amendment: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network and the Right to "Approach and
Offer" in Abortion Clinic Protests, 50 STAN. L. REV. 179, 181 (1997) (arguing that Supreme
Court's approach to abortion clinic injunctions casts doubt on continuing validity of
"important and time honored free speech and religion cases").
11 See sources cited supra note 150.
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backed away from Dennis. Only three years after Madsen, Schenck
presented the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the issue.
III. SCHENCK V. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As in Madsen, the original Schenck injunction banned only
violent and disruptive conduct rather than expression.'52 Also as
in Madsen, the original injunction proved ineffective in preventing
"constructive blockades" by protestors'53 or the devolution of even
peaceful counseling attempts into harassment when the counselors
became angered.'54 Thus, the district court amended the injunc-
tion to include a ban on demonstrating within fifteen feet of
entrances and driveways of the medical facilities or around any
person or vehicle entering or leaving the clinics.'55 While the
order excepted from the fifteen-foot buffer zone sidewalk counseling
of a non-threatening nature by no more than two people, it
provided that sidewalk counselors were to "cease and desist" upon
a person's indication that she did not wish to be counseled. 5 6
In a two-to-one decision, a three-judge panel of the Second
Circuit reversed the injunction with respect to the fifteen-foot
buffer zone and sidewalk counseling provisions, holding that they
152 Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377,382 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) (describing initial TRO as enjoining protestors from
trespassing, blocking, or impeding access to clinic facilities, physically abusing or harassing
people entering or leaving facilities, and making excessively loud noises which disturb,
injure, or endanger the health of clinic patients and employees).
" Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423-24 (W.D.N.Y.
1992), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d
Cir. 1994), vacated in part en banc, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 117
S. Ct. 855 (1997). According to the district court, the protestors, while not physically
blockading the facilities, engaged in a "constructive blockade" by forcing patients and staff
"to run a gauntlet of harassment and intimidation." Id. at 1424.
" Id. at 1425. The court noted that, while much of the counseling was peaceful,
counselors often became angry and frustrated when patients nevertheless entered the clinics,
and subsequently turned to "harassing, badgering, intimidating and yelling at the patients
... even after the patients signal [led] their desire to be left alone. The 'sidewalk counselors'
often crowd[ed] around patients, invade[d] their personal space and raise[d] their voices to
a loud and disturbing level." Id.
' Id. at 1440 (paragraph 1(b) of preliminary injunction).
Id. (paragraph 1(c) of preliminary injunction).
[Vol. 33:1
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violated Madsen's requirement that injunctions "burden no more
speech than necessary." 5 ' The Second Circuit then granted a
rehearing en banc and reversed the panel in a 13-2 decision,'58
though the judges attacked the issue from different perspectives.
Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, applied Madsen and found
that the injunctive provisions were sufficiently narrowly tailored to
meet the government's interest in securing access to clinics and the
safe performance of abortions.' 59 In contrast, Judge Winter, in a
separate opinion that also garnered a majority of the justices,
argued that the injunction was justified primarily because the
protestors' expressive activities were coercive in such a way as to
take them out of the purview of the First Amendment altogeth-
er.16  Finally, the two dissenters reiterated the belief expressed
in their earlier panel opinion that the injunction was an unconstitu-
tional restriction on free speech.' 6'
157 Schenck, 67 F.3d at 370-71. According to the panel, the buffer zone was invalid
because there was no evidence that protestors' attempts to block access to the clinics were
pervasive or successful. Id. Relying on that portion of Madsen which found the "no
approach" zone unconstitutional, the panel further argued that the "cease and desist"
provision violated the notion that "in public debate, our citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous speech." Id. at 371-72 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
' Id. at 377.
"
9 Id. at 386-93. Judge Oakes noted that the "cease and desist" provision was also
justified as necessary "to protect not only the right of access to abortions but, in effect, the
physical well-being of women seeking such access and held captive by medical circumstance."
Id. at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted). He further distinguished the "cease and
desist' provision from the "no approach" provision in Madsen noting that the former was "far
more solicitous of demonstrators' interests" because it allowed for face-to-face contact even
without the express consent of the patient. Id. at 390-91.
10 According to Judge Winter:
[T]he First Amendment does not, in any context, protect coercive or
obstructionist conduct that intimidates or physically prevents individuals
from going about ordinary affairs .... inhere is no right to invade the
personal space of individuals going about [their] lawful business, to dog
their footsteps or chase them down a street, to scream and gesticulate in
their faces, or to do anything else that cannot fairly be described as an
attempt at peaceful persuasion.
Id. at 394-96 (Winter, J., concurring in the result). Characterizing the protest activities as
coercive because they targeted specific individuals at certain difficult-to-leave locations, he
would have ruled on that basis alone that the 15-foot buffer zone and 'cease and desist"
provisions were valid. Id. at 396-98.
161 Id. at 401-03 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissenters especially eschewed the
majority's use of privacy interests and the captive audience doctrine to support the "cease
and desist" provision, noting that such interests rarely supported restrictions of speech in
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The Supreme Court, like Judge Oakes, engaged in a straightfor-
ward application of the principles enunciated in Madsen, focusing
primarily on whether the fifteen-foot buffer zone burdened more
speech than necessary.'62 Initially, the Court characterized the
buffer zone slightly differently than did the lower courts. According
to the Court, the buffer zone had "fixed" and "floating" aspects.
163
To the extent that the fifteen-foot zone extended around entrances
and driveways, it was fixed (i.e., did not move), but to the extent
that the fifteen-foot zone extended around people or vehicles
seeking access to or leaving clinics, it floated (i.e., the zone actually
moved with the persons or vehicles as they moved).' The Court
concluded that these different aspects of the buffer zone required
separate analysis.
The Court acknowledged the protestors' history of "abusive
conduct, harassment of the police that hampered law enforcement,
and the tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into
aggressive and sometimes violent conduct." 6 ' The majority
nevertheless struck the floating buffer zone, fearing that its fluid
nature would render protestors unable to comply without risking
their safety.6 6 It also noted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
compliance when several people simultaneously sought to enter or
leave the clinics-a phenomenon that would render the floating
zones completely amorphous. 167 The lack of certainty in terms of
compliance led "to a substantial risk that much more speech
[would] be burdened than the injunction by its terms prohib-
the public forum, and certainly did not support the provision in this instance. Id. at 405-06.
16 The Court noted that the government interests at stake were essentially the same as
those in Madsen--ensuring public order, promoting the free flow of traffic, protecting
property rights, and protecting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Schenck, 117
S. Ct. at 866. Given that such interests were "certainly significant enough to justify an
appropriately tailored injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to the clinics," id., the
only question was whether the injunction was appropriately tailored.
16 Id. at 862.
- Id. at 864.
'6 Id. at 867.
. Id. The Court noted that the buffer zones might force protestors into the street in
order for them to walk alongside a person while maintaining a fifteen-foot buffer. Id.
" Id. According to the Court, protestors wishing to move in concert with an individual
"are then faced with the problem of watching out for other individuals entering or leaving
the clinic who are heading the opposite way from the individual they have targeted." Id.
[Vol. 33:1
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it[edl. " 16 The Court did not, however, rule out all future at-
tempts to separate protestors and others. Instead it emphasized
that while the floating zone was unconstitutional, "some sort of
zone of separation" between protestors and individuals seeking
access to or leaving clinics might have been appropriate.'69
In contrast to the floating buffer zones, the fixed buffer zones
around clinic entrances survived scrutiny under Madsen because
they were "necessary to ensure that people and vehicles trying to
enter or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots [could] do
so. 1 °"' Specifically, the majority held that
[biased on defendants' past conduct, the District
Court was entitled to conclude that some of the
defendants who were allowed within 5 to 10 feet of
clinic entrances would not merely engage in station-
ary, nonobstructive demonstrations but would
continue to do what they had done before: aggres-
sively follow and crowd individuals right up to the
clinic door and then refuse to move, or purposefully
mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to
impede or block the progress of cars.'
Moreover, the fixed zone carried with it none of the uncertainty
that accompanied the floating buffer zones. Thus, the injunctive
provision allowing fixed buffer zones burdened no more speech than
necessary to ensure access to clinics.
The majority further found that the "cease and desist" provision
survived constitutional scrutiny-at least insofar as it existed
within the fixed buffer zones. 2 Though initially questioning the
district court's basis for the provision (i.e., to protect the right of
1" Id.
... See id. (stating that, because the zone could not be sustained on the record, its
appropriateness in other circumstances need not be decided).
170 Id. at 868.
'
71Id. at 869.
172 See id. at 870 (holding that "cease and desist" exception for sidewalk counselors
enhanced, rather than abridged free speech rights). The majority refused to comment on the
constitutionality of the "cease and desist" provision insofar as it related to floating buffer
zones because it found such zones to be unconstitutional. Id. at 868.
19981
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people seeking access to the facilities to be left alone),173 the
majority nonetheless upheld it as "an effort to enhance petitioners'
speech rights" by allowing some protestors access to the buffer zone
in order to express their message peacefully." The Court fur-
ther rejected petitioners' argument that the "cease and desist"
provision was an illegitimate content-based regulation, noting that
"counselors remain[ed] free to espouse their message outside the
fifteen-foot buffer zone, and the condition on their freedom to
espouse it within the buffer zone [was] the result of their own
previous harassment and intimidation of patients."75
As in Madsen, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, vigorously dissented. According to Justice Scalia, "no
right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while
seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics" existed and an
injunction based solely upon this interest was illegitimate. 176 He
also took his colleagues to task for upholding the injunction even
while recognizing that the "right to be left alone" was inconsistent
with First Amendment principles, 177 characterizing the majority's
actions as an illegitimate exercise of government power.'78 Such
a substitution of government interests by a higher court was
especially problematic in his view because the case involved a "trial
court[] order imposing a prior restraint upon speech."'79
B. PROTESTOR RESPONSE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: PARALLELS TO
YATES
Protestor response to Schenck was quite different than the
response to Madsen. Rather than denounce the Court's decision to
173 Id. at 870. According to the Court, no such generalized right to privacy exists on
public streets or sidewalks. Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 871 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
believed that the buffer zone and "cease and desist" provisions were both based upon such
a right. Id. at 871-72. He admitted, however, that the creation of buffer zones might have
been constitutional absent the "cease and desist" provision because the district court had
pointed partly to access problems to justify such zones. Id. at 871, 875.
'7 Id. at 872.
17" Id. at 871-73.
'7 Id. at 873.
[Vol. 33:1
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uphold portions of the injunction, protestors and their supporters
lauded the Court's willingness to strike down the floating buffer
zone as a recognition that "the 1st Amendment applies to the pro-
life message, and [that] there is no longer an exception to the free-
speech clause when the issue deals with abortion.""'8 Some went
as far as expressly characterizing the decision as a "change of
heart" by the Court.' Even neutral observers, including free
speech scholars, characterized Schenck as a strong affirmation of
the rights of speakers to engage in "free speech of the loud,
aggressive in-your-face variety"' 2 -a far cry from earlier charac-
terizations of Madsen as "a loss for civil liberties ... [giving]
protestors a relatively low level of constitutional protection from
injunctions."8 3
One could conclude that the Schenck Court, like the Yates Court
before it, rectified an earlier, bad decision and restored the
protestors' free speech rights. After all, though the Schenck Court
purported to apply Madsen's principles, it struck down the floating
buffer zone-easily the most restrictive portion of the injunction
against the protestors.' 84 Perhaps this was the Schenck Court's
way of gutting Madsen without actually overruling it, just as Yates
did to Dennis. The social context in which Schenck was decided
lends support to this characterization of the case. By the time the
Court decided Schenck, violent and disruptive actions on the part
of anti-abortion protestors apparently fell dramatically from all-
""' Savage, supra note 16, at Al (quoting Jay Sekulow, attorney for the protestors); see
also A Better Balance on Protest Reversed an Earlier Restriction on Anti-abortion Protestors,
FRESNO BEE, Feb. 25, 1997, at B4 (noting that the Schenck Court "righted the delicate
balance that must be maintained at the abortion clinic door").
"I The Right to Protest, INDIANAPOLIs STAR, Mar. 2, 1997, at C2.
' Savage, supra note 17, at Al; see also id. (quoting University of Southern California
Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as stating "[tihis case establishes a strong [First]
Amendment right to speak, even when the people say they don't want to be spoken to"); id.
(quoting Professor Rodney Smolla of William and Mary Law School as noting that Schenck
was a "strong affirmation of the in-your-face view of the [First] Amendment").
" William H. Freivogel, Center Court Four Justices Largely Shaped Decisions of Supreme
Court During Its Recent Term, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 3, 1994, at BI; see also sources
cited supra note 150.
"' The floating buffer zone was more restrictive than the fixed buffer zone because, being
tied to mobile persons. it potentially suppressed speech in a large area around the clinic.
After Schenck, however, protestors were prohibited only from protesting within fifteen feet
of clinic entrances and driveways, but they were allowed to approach anyone outside of those
clearly defined areas.
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time highs in 1992 and 1993, the years immediately preceding
Madsen.' Moreover, anti-abortion forces made a conscious effort
to mainstream themselves, publicly turning away from unpopular
mass demonstrations and toward more traditional efforts, such as
filling state and federal legislative positions with anti-abortion
advocates. 86 By 1997, the public spotlight focused far less on
abortion protestors than on a more traditional debate regarding
abortion policy.' Just as anti-communist hysteria began to
wane by the time of Yates, one could say that Schenck was decided
in calmer times when the Court could see the error of its ways.
IV. THE ABORTION PROTEST CASES IN THE CONTEXT OF
PAST DOCTRINE
The social context of Madsen and Schenck certainly lends some
support to the protestors' claims. But what about the legal context?
1
" According to the National Abortion Federation, violent acts by abortion protestors fell
from an all-time high of 437 incidents in 1993 to 111 incidents in 1996. National Abortion
Federation, Incidents of Violence and Disruption Against Abortion Providers, 1998 (visited
Sept. 22, 1998) <http:J/www.prochoice.org/violence/98vd.html>. Interestingly, although
incidents of disruption declined in 1993-95 from an all-time 1992 high, they more than
doubled in 1996. Id. Few newspapers reported this latter fact, cf David J. Garrow, When
'Compromise' Means Caving In, WASH. POST, June 1, 1997, at C3 (discussing attacks on
abortion clinics in 1997 and lack of newspaper coverage), choosing instead to focus on the
decline in violent activities. See, e.g., Emily Bazar, Foes of Abortion Intend to Widen Their
Audience, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 8, 1997, at Al; Julie Tamaki & Martha L. Willman,
Abortion Clinic is Firebombed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1997, at B1 (Valley Edition). This
tendency by reporters to focus only on declining violence lent some credence to the protestors'
claims that legislative action (primarily the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1993) forced them to abandon much of their protest activity. Tamaki & Willnan, supra
(noting protestors' attribution of the decline in their activity to the 1993 Act).
1
" See Carey Goldberg, How Political Theater Lost Its Audience, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1997, § 4, at 6 (discussing Operation Rescue's "new tactic" of fielding seven candidates for
congressional office). The protestors also planned to employ more peaceful, economic
boycotts of corporations donating money to organizations such as Planned Parenthood.
Bazar, supra note 185, at Al.
"' In contrast to hearings regarding abortion violence held in 1993, see generally S. REP.
No. 103-117, supra note 127, the legislative battleground in 1997 focused on partial-birth
abortion and international funding issues. See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 185, at C3
(discussingvarious federal legislative proposals regarding "partial-birth" abortion ban); John
M. Goshko, Dispute Stalls U.S. Plan to Cut Its U.N. Dues, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1997, at A17
(discussing House of Representatives' refusal to approve bill providing funds for past U.N.
dues because of dispute over funding for international family planning agencies who perform
abortions or promote liberalized abortion laws).
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From a doctrinal standpoint do Madsen and Schenck parallel the
Dennis/Yates pattern? In order to live up to such a claim, two
issues are critical: First, Madsen must be inconsistent with past
doctrine such that we view it as a political decision rather than a
product ofjudicial reasoning. Second, Schenck must be inconsistent
with Madsen in order to support the claim that it represents the
Court's return to sound First Amendment principles. Ultimately,
neither of these facts is true.
A. PLACING MADSEN IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
In upholding the convictions of the communist defendants, the
Dennis plurality purported to apply past precedent, noting that the
"clear and present danger" test had been applied to subversive
advocacy cases since its 1919 decision in Schenck v. United States.
Yet Chief Justice Vinson did not apply that test in any recognizable
manner. Rather, he transformed a relatively strict test into a
malleable balancing test and applied it in a manner to suit the
"political exigencies" of the case. Madsen does not appear to follow
such a pattern. While Dennis involved a scenario (criminal
punishment of subversive advocacy) and a test that had been before
the Court many times, the situation presented to the Madsen Court
was relatively unique. The Court has previously faced both
injunctions against speech and time, place, and manner regulations
of speech. But prior to Madsen, it never faced an injunction placing
a time, place, and manner restriction on speech. In light of this
unique situation, the Madsen Court quite candidly announced a
new standard. Though one may disagree with the standard applied
in Madsen, the Court's approach is not the obvious manipulation of
an existing standard as in Dennis.
There is also nothing in the Court's past doctrine regarding prior
restraints, protestors, or content discrimination that necessitates
a different result. Despite the protestors' intimations, 8 ' the
Court's antipathy to prior restraints (i.e., those regulations that
. The protestors' claim that Madsen signaled a retreat "to the dark ages when speech
was permitted only at the discretion of government officials," Greene, supra note 117, at 32,
intimates that Madsen somehow deviated from the Court's past prior restraint precedents.
1998]
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attempt to suppress expression in advance of publication) 89 does
not compel a different outcome in Madsen. To be sure, the Court
has found injunctions to be prior restraints."9 Indeed, so many
of the Court's significant prior restraint decisions involve injunc-
tions that Professor Jefflies has noted that "despite its original
reference to official licensing, the doctrine of prior restraint today
is understood by many people to mean chiefly a rule of special
hostility to injunctions."'9 ' But any notion that all injunctions
amount to prior restraints is purely a popular one. The Court has
never issued such a broad ruling. On at least one occasion, it
explicitly debunked such a notion.192 Occasionally, the Court has
" See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) ("The term 'prior
restraint' is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to
occur.'" (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14
(1984))). As Professor Emerson has noted, the primary importance of the prior restraint
category is its distinction from subsequent punishment: "[A] system of prior restraint would
prevent communication from occurring at all; a system of subsequent punishment allows the
communication but imposes a penalty after the event." Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 648 (1955).
The Court has repeatedly stated that "[amny system of prior restraint of expression ...
bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Although the Court has stated that its hostility toward
prior restraints "is not an absolute prohibition in all circumstances," Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976), its presumption against such restraints thus far has been
insurmountable. See Marin Scordato, Distinction without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) ("So strict is the scrutiny applied
under the doctrine that the Supreme Court has never upheld a law that it has characterized
as a prior restraint on pure speech.").
" See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 539 (characterizing injunction prohibiting press from
publishing inculpatory evidence pertaining to criminal defendant prior to jury impanelment
as prior restraint); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (characterizing
injunction against newspaper's publication of historical information pertaining to Vietnam
War as prior restraint); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
(characterizing injunction against distribution of leaflets in particular community as prior
restraint); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (characterizing as prior restraint statute
which allowed permanent injunction banning distribution of literature).
... John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 426 (1983).
The Court itself has referred to injunctions as "classic examples of prior restraints."
Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550; Smith v. Daily Mail Pub'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)
(characterizing pretrial order barring publication of crime victim's name as "classic prior
restraint").
1
92 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973) (noting that the Court "has never held that all injunctions are impermissible); see
also Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418-19 (implying that an injunction designed to remedy private
wrongs rather than to suppress speech would have been permissible).
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even upheld the use of injunctions against expression. 193  More-
over, to the extent that the Court characterizes injunctions as prior
restraints, it tends to do so because they involve bans on dissemi-
nation of information1 94 or protest activity. 95 Given the Court's
clear statement that "informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment,"'96 suppression of informa-
tion, even temporarily, 97 is something about which the Court is
especially concerned. But Madsen involved a time, place, and
manner regulation of protestors that still permitted them to speak
within reasonably close proximity to their intended recipients.'98
The Madsen majority reasonably could have seen a difference
between that regulation and previous injunctions. Finally, prior
restraints are often disfavored because they require judges and
administrators to assess the potential harm of speech prior to
dissemination, thus allowing them potentially to overemphasize the
risks of speech. 99 But the Madsen injunction issued after a
history of (and as an attempt to prevent future) violence, disruption
193 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978).
1" In New York Times, for example, the Court found unconstitutional a permanent ban
on dissemination of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times and the Washington Post.
403 U.S. at 713; see also Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543 (overturning trial court order
banning publication of defendant's confession until jury was empaneled); Keefe, 402 U.S. at
415 (reversing trial court order banning distribution of leaflets within city limits).
" See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)
(addressing ex parte order forbidding white supremacist organization from holding any
rallies in the county for at least 10 days); National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1977) (addressing order that prohibited National Socialist Party of America from
marching, parading or distributing any materials designed to incite or promote hatred
against persons of the Jewish faith anywhere within village of Skokie, Illinois).
1" Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
117 As the Court has noted, the "element of time is not unimportant" to the effective
dissemination of information. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561; see also Carroll, 393 U.S. at
182 (noting particular importance of timeliness in context of political rally).
"9 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (noting that
protestors could be "seen and heard" from abortion clinic parking lot).
'" See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973) ('The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed,
either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate
determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment."); Vincent Blasi, Toward a
Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 52-53 (1981)
(discussing administrators' tendency to exaggerate risks of harm prior to occurrence of
speech).
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and harassment, making it far less likely that the trial court would
exaggerate the risks involved-a factor the Court has previously
noted in upholding some injunctions against expression. 200
Though one may disagree with the ultimate treatment of the
injunction in Madsen, the Court's prior cases do not preclude the
result.
Public response implying that Madsen somehow retreated from
the Court's previous strong protection of protest activity similarly
misses the mark.2' Certainly, the Court has derailed numerous
government attempts to suppress mass protests," 2 emphatically
stating that they are "an exercise of... basic constitutional rights
in their most pristine and classic form."20 3 But the Court's
primary concern in those decisions was the arbitrary use of a
largely vague statute to suppress unpopular First Amendment
activity.0 4  It never implied that appropriate regulation of
' See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390 ("Because the order is based on a continuing
course of repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to speculate as to
the effect of publication."); see also Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 292 (1941) (upholding injunction of peaceful picketing because it was
"enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct").
"1 See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text (discussing public response to
Madsen).
' See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (reversing criminal
convictions of nonviolent civil rights protestors); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969) (same); Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (same); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) (same).
2w Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235.
'o The Court's earlier protest decisions arose out of mass demonstrations during the civil
rights era and largely involved convictions of peaceful protestors under breach of the peace
or disorderly conduct statutes. Such statutes were frequently written in broad terms,
prohibiting "a violation of public order, [or] a disturbance of the public tranquility, by any
act or conduct inciting to violence." Edwards, 372 U.S. at 234 (describing South Carolina
breach of peace law); see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 544 (citing Louisiana law). Convictions under
such statutes raised the specter that the protestors were punished for expressing unpopular
views. For example, the Edwards Court stated:
These petitioners were convicted of an offense so generalized as to be...
"not susceptible of exact definition." And they were convicted upon
evidence which showed no more than that the opinions which they were
peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the
majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police
protection.
372 U.S. at 237 (quoting Edwards v. State, 123 S.E.2d 247, 249 (S.C. 1961) rev'd sub nom
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)); see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (stating that
evidence indicated only that student protestor views were opposed to the majority).
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protestors was unacceptable. Rather, it explicitly noted that
narrowly drawn statutes regulating protest activity were constitu-
tionally permissible," 5 a notion that the Court's subsequent cases
reinforce."' On the whole, the Madsen injunction's prohibitions
were quite specific-to the point of giving exact distances regarding
protest activity."0 7 They thus gave little discretion to public
officials while still allowing anti-abortion protestors to speak. The
Madsen Court's willingness to uphold those aspects of the injunc-
tion is not clearly inconsistent with its past precedent regarding
protestors. Moreover, to the extent that an injunctive provision
apparently regulated protestors based on the offensiveness of their
speech,0 ' the Madsen majority struck it down-an action quite
Claiborne Hardware involved the imposition of civil damages and an injunction on civil
rights protestors because of alleged violations of state common law. 458 U.S. at 890-92.
Though recognizing that some of the protestors engaged in acts of violence, the Court
ultimately overturned the trial court's verdict, noting that the evidence was "inadequate to
assure the 'precision of regulation' demanded by [the First Amendment]." Id. at 921. In
effect, the Court found that the lower court's findings were too ambiguous to ensure that only
non-protected activity was affected-much like the flaw in the criminal statutes discussed
above. Justice Scalia's cries notwithstanding, see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part),
Claiborne Hardware does not stand for the proposition that all injunctions against protestors
are subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, the decision focused on the appropriateness of civil
penalties based upon ambiguous evidence. The Court did ultimately strike down the
injunction as well but almost as an afterthought. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 924 n.67.
206 See, e.g., Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236 ("We do not review in this case criminal convictions
resulting from the evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory
statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed.
If, for example, the petitioners had been convicted upon evidence that they violated a law
regulating traffic, or disobeyed a law reasonably limiting the periods during which the State
House grounds were open to the public, this would be a different case.").
2 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (concluding that "the government
may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations" on protests); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1972) (upholding regulation of protestors because it was
.narrowly tailored ... [and... [gave] no license to punish anyone because of what he is
saying").
... For example, the trial court's final order in Madsen prohibited demonstrating within
36 feet of clinic property as well as any unwanted approaches of persons seeking clinic
services within 300 feet of clinic property. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla. 1993) affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
206 See 512 U.S. at 773-74 (striking down 300-foot"no approach" zone as violating Court's
oft-stated belief that "in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous speech" (citation omitted)).
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consistent with the Court's earlier concern regarding suppression
of unpopular speech. Madsen is therefore not utterly out-of-line
with the Court's past doctrine.
Finally, the Court's past doctrine does not compel application of
a different standard of review than that applied in Madsen.
Typically, the Court distinguishes between content-based regula-
tions (i.e., regulations that "limit communication because of the
message it conveys"). 9 and content-neutral regulations (i.e.,
regulations that affect speech but are not aimed at its content).210
The Court sustains the former only if they survive strict scruti-
ny-the regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
state interest.21' In contrast, the Court judges the latter under
a more lenient, intermediate standard, sustaining such regulations
if they "are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information."212 Importantly,
the Court's two-tiered approach evolved in cases where it consid-
ered the constitutionality of a generally applicable statute or
ordinance. In such cases the Court could determine relatively
easily the nature of the statute and apply the requisite standard of
review.21 Madsen, however, was the Court's first opportunity to
' Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46, 47 (1987).
210 Two primary forms of such restrictions exist. First, laws may aim at expression, but
may do so in a way that has nothing to do with the message conveyed (for example, a law
banning the use of amplified sound trucks in private residential areas). Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). Second, laws may aim at regulating conduct but may have an
incidental effect on expression (for example, a law banning the burning of draft cards).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 386 (1968).
211 See, e.g., R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,395-96 (1992) (holding that ordinance
prohibiting display of symbols known to "arouseD anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" was unnecessary for protection of state's
interest); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
123 (1991) (holding that interest of New York's victims could not justify state's overly broad
"Son of Sam" law).
212 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
21 Generally, the Court has looked to the face of the statute or to objectively determina-
ble justifications for the statute in order to determine whether it is content-based or content-
neutral. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375 (finding that statute prohibiting burning of draft cards
"does not abridge free speech on its face'); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding
unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of school except
peaceful labor picketing). Occasionally, however, the Court finds it difficult to distinguish
[Vol. 33:1
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apply content-discrimination principles to an injunction.214 As
the Madsen Court noted, the injunction before it was a bit of a
hybrid-content-neutral but posing some danger of government
abuse, a concern with content-based statutes.2 5 To that extent,
the Court decided to apply a hybridized standard somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny.216 Such an application
is far more honest than the Dennis Court's covert creation of a new
standard.
One could argue that the Court should view an injunction which
impacts only speakers with a particular viewpoint as content-based
or viewpoint-based rather than content-neutral. Such an argument
finds support in the Court's antipathy toward suppression of
particular viewpoints. But the Madsen Court's refusal to take such
a view also has support in the Court's past doctrine. The Madsen
injunction was facially content-neutral, regulating only the
procedural aspects of the expression rather than its content. The
Court frequently concludes that a regulation is content-neutral and
subject to lesser scrutiny on the basis of such facial neutrality.217
Occasionally, the Court closely scrutinizes and strikes facially
content-neutral regulations having a severely disparate impact on
speakers.218 Using lesser scrutiny, however, the Court often
upholds content-neutral laws that admittedly have a disparate
impact on speakers but that leave open opportunities to communi-
between such statutes; see, e.g., City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(determining that facially content-based statute was content-neutral); see also infra notes
248-272 and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal inconsistencies in Court's approach to
content-based and content-neutral statutes).
214 Though the content-based/content-neutral distinction is one of the major organizing
principles of the Court'3 current jurisprudence, see generally Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991), it evolved only in
recent decades, essentially stemming from Mosley. Most of the Court's injunction cases were
decided prior to the full establishment of this approach and were considered under either the
prior restraint doctrine or other principles.
215 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994).
26 See id. (finding that content-neutral injunction warrants more rigorous analysis than
standard time, place, and manner analysis).
217 See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (finding that regulation prohibiting the burning of
draft cards was content-neutral).
218 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (striking down
municipal ban on distribution of door-to-door circulars because method of distribution
severely impacted poorly financed and unpopular causes).
1998]
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cate 19 Thus, the Madsen Court's refusal to strictly scrutinize
the injunction simply because it had a disparate impact on
protestors is not wholly inconsistent with past doctrine, especially
given that the protestors were able to convey their message within
reasonable proximity to their intended recipients.
B. PLACING SCHENCK IN THE MADSEN FRAMEWORK
Just as Madsen does not parallel Dennis, Schenck does not
parallel Yates. The Court in Yates faced a scenario so close to
Dennis that one of the Justices described the defendants as
"engaged in this conspiracy with the [Dennis] defendants," and as
"serv[ing] in the same army and engag[ing] in the same mis-
sion." "' The Yates Court nevertheless reversed all of the
defendants' convictions, but did not overrule Dennis. Rather, the
Yates Court managed to gut the Court's earlier holding while
purporting to apply its principles. Schenck simply does not follow
this pattern.
Schenck and Madsen did involve similarly situated petitioners.
Clearly, the protestors in both cases worked toward the same
goal-the eradication of abortion services-and they used similar
disruptive tactics to further that goal. In this sense, the Schenck
and Madsen petitioners were "serving in the same army and
engaging in the same mission" much like the communist defen-
dants. But the Schenck Court's willingness to uphold portions of
the injunction after applying Madsen's principles does not mean
that the Schenck Court gutted the earlier decision. First, Madsen
upheld a thirty-six-foot buffer zone while the Schenck Court refused
to uphold a smaller, fifteen-foot buffer zone. But unlike the
floating buffer zone struck down in Schenck, the Madsen thirty-six-
foot buffer zone was fixed and did not pose the same problems with
219 See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
654-55 (1981) (upholding restrictions on leafleting in walking areas of state fair); O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 389 (upholding restriction on knowingly destroying draft cards and finding that
defendant could have conveyed message through alternative means).
'o Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344-45 (1957) (Clark J., dissenting).
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compliance or potential chilling of speech. 2' Second, in refusing
to uphold the fifteen-foot floating buffer zone, the Schenck Court
relied solely on the difficulty of compliance with that injunctive
provision, finding that such difficulty violated Madsen's require-
ment that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest.2 The Court did not
hold that protestors had a right to engage in aggressive or face-to-
face protests. In fact, the Court suggested that a more narrowly
tailored injunction creating "some sort of zone of separation"
between protestors and individuals seeking access or egress from
the clinic might have been appropriate. 3 Thus, to say that
Schenck represents a retreat from Madsen is to ignore the facts in
Schenck as well as what the Schenck Court said.
Finally, though the Yates Court purported to apply the earlier
principles announced in Dennis, it did no such thing. Rather it
manipulated the earlier test in Dennis, which focused on the
gravity of the evil presented by a communist conspiracy, into a test
that focused mainly on whether the communist defendants had
expressly advocated the violent overthrow of the government. That
is, Yates obviously changed the focus of the Dennis test though it
refused to admit to doing so. Instead of changing the focus of
Madsen, Schenck examined and applied Madsen's principles in
excruciating detail. In fact, the Schenck Court was willing to
uphold most of the challenged portions of the injunction after an
application of the earlier decision. Thus, it is difficult to conclude
that Schenck somehow diminished the Madsen standard. This is
especially true when one considers the Schenck Court's willingness
to uphold the "cease and desist" provision when the Madsen Court
struck a similar provision.224 If anything, the Schenck Court
went further than Madsen in upholding restrictions against speech.
" The Madsen buffer zone was tied to the property line surrounding the clinic, Madsen,
512 U.S. at 771, while the floating buffer zone in Schenck was tied to persons who were
continually entering and leaving the clinics. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855,
866-67 (1997). Moreover, the Schenck Court upheld a fixed buffer zone much like the one
in Madsen. 117 S. Ct. at 868.
22 See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (explaining the Schenck Court's
reasons for striking down floating buffer zone).
22 Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867.
'2' Madsen struck down the 300-foot "no approach" zone, claiming it violated the Court's
previous decisions refusing to protect people from offensive speech. 512 U.S. at 774.
19981
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V. SUPREME COURT COMPLICITY IN PROTESTOR
MISCHARACTERIZATIONS
Though Madsen and Schenck do not parallel the doctrinal aspects
of the earlier communist decisions, the Court is not wholly without
fault regarding protestor manipulation of the abortion protest
decisions. Indeed, the majority opinions225 in Madsen and
Schenck are spectacular examples of the Court's tendency to ignore
theoretical principles and to default to supportive rhetoric or
precedent while ignoring contradictory or ambiguous language and
decisions. Such a tactic allowed the dissenting Justices and the
protestors to accuse those in the majority of manipulation, thus
detracting from the legitimacy of its decisions. Nowhere is this
manner of response more evident than in Madsen's discussion of
the prior restraint doctrine and the problem of motive in content-
discrimination, and Schenck's discussion of the "cease and desist"
provision.
A. PRIOR RESTRAINT
Given the popular association of injunctions and prior re-
straints,226 the Madsen petitioners' attempt to cast the injunction
as a prior restraint was, if not a winning argument, certainly a
logical one. Yet, the Madsen Court's response to that argument
was so minimal-a single footnote-as to imply that it was almost
frivolous. While acknowledging that "[pirior restraints do often
take the form of injunctions," citing New York Times v. United
States22 and Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,228 the Madsen
majority ruled that this particular injunction was not a prior
restraint, noting that "[n]ot all injunctions which may incidentally
affect expression ... are 'prior restraints' as that term was used in
2' This is not to say that the dissenting opinions are models of theoretical reasoning.
They are not. In fact, both dissents engage in many of the same tactics and rhetorical
devices as the majority opinions. This discussion focuses on the majority opinions, however,
because those are the opinions to which the public responded.
' See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing popular understanding that
doctrine of prior restraint is largely aimed at eradicating injunctions against speech).
mz 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
22 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
[Vol. 33:1
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ga. L. Rev. 48 1998-1999
THEORETICAL ABYSS
New York Times Co. or Vance."229 The Court further bolstered its
rejection of the protestors' argument by briefly pointing out that the
injunction was not content-based and that the petitioners were still
free to disseminate their message outside of the thirty-six-foot
buffer zone." °
Unfortunately, the majority's terse discussion raised more
questions than it answered. Its allusion to New York Times and
Vance was at the very least unhelpful and, more probably, confus-
ing. The per curiam opinion in New York Times consisted of barely
ten sentences, simply stating in relevant part:
We granted certiorari in these cases in which the
United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times
and the Washington Post from publishing the con-
tents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy."
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity." The Government "thus
carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of such a restraint.". . . [The District
Courts] held that the Government had not met that
burden. We agree."
The opinion contained absolutely no jurisprudential discussion of
the factors necessary to make injunctions into prior restraints. The
actual analysis in New York Times was so thin, it prompted one
commentator to note that it did "not make any law at all, good or
bad" and that on the issue of "whether injunctions against the
press are permissible, ... [New York Times] can supply no
precedent." 2 Vance similarly sheds no light on the subject. It,
like New York Times, contains little discussion of the characteris-
229 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 n.2.2WId.
231New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted).
232 Peter Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1971).
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tics of injunctions warranting the "prior restraint" label.
Moreover, Vance involved an injunction against the publication of
obscenity, a situation in which the Court takes a particularly
unique approach.234 In fact, both cases reflect a broader problem
with the Court's jurisprudence regarding prior restraints: rather
than engage in meaningful analysis, the Court has more or less
simply concluded that a particular judicial order was or was not a
prior restraint without discussing the factors supporting its
determination.235  Thus, if the Madsen majority expected its
reference to New York Times and Vance to explain its decision, it
failed miserably. If anything, Madsen simply furthers the incoher-
ence already associated with the prior restraint doctrine.
The Madsen Court's reference to the injunction's content-
neutrality and limited nature, while apparently an attempt to
' In Vance, a Texas statute allowed judges to issue injunctions barring all future
displays of obscenity based upon a showing that obscene films were exhibited in the past.
445 U.S. at 311. According to the Court, the statutory scheme was invalid because it
'authorize[d] prior restraints of indefinite duration on the exhibition of motion pictures that
have not been finally adjudicated to be obscene." Id. at 316. This statement does not clarify
whether the injunction was a prior restraint because of its perpetual nature and imposition
in advance of an obscenity determination or whether the injunction is a prior restraint that
also happens to have those characteristics.
" Id. at 315-17. The Court has generally upheld injunctions against exhibition of
obscene motion pictures as long as the government employs "a constitutionally acceptable
standard for determining what is unprotected by the First Amendment" and "impose[s] no
restraint... until after a full adversary proceeding and final judicial determination... that
the materials were constitutionally unprotected." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49,55 (1973). Much of the Court's reasoning in such cases stems from the fact that obscenity
has no First Amendment value. Outside of the obscenity context, however, that certain
speech may enjoy no First Amendment protection does not support the use of a prior
restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931) (holding that prior restraints are
invalid even where speech regulated may be criminally punished); Jeffries, supra note 191,
at 410 ("[S]peech that validly could be controlled by subsequent punishment nevertheless
would be immune from regulation by prior restraint.").
Professor Jefftries eloquently notes this failure in his statement that'the Court has yet
to explain (at least in terms that I understand) what it is about an injunction that justifies
this independent rule of constitutional disfavor." Jeffiies, supra note 191, at 417. Other
scholars also generally question the Court's determination that injunctions are prior
restraints. See, e.g., William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process:
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine,
67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 253 (1982) (arguing that prompt judicial review removes injunction
from prior restraint doctrine); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 90 (1984) (arguing that injunctions
pose no greater harm to First Amendment interests than does subsequent punishment);
Scordato, supra note 189, at 15 (same).
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explain when injunctions amount to prior restraints, is similarly
problematic. To be sure, some of the Court's most significant cases
overturning court orders under the prior restraint doctrine have
involved content-based restrictions of speech.236 But this does not
clearly dispose of the issue. Prior to Madsen, the Court never
explicitly required content discrimination as a predicate for a
finding of prior restraint (which may explain the Madsen Court's
failure to cite any precedent supporting this proposition). In fact,
the Court occasionally has upheld content-based injunctions,
sometimes without even discussing the prior restraint issue.237
It also has found at least one facially content-neutral injunction to
be invalid.238 That the Court has not required content-discrimi-
nation as a basis for finding an injunction invalid does not mean
that the Madsen majority could not reconcile its remark with
earlier decisions, but it certainly did not.
The Madsen Court's simple citation to past precedent with no
explanation or attempt at reconciliation gave Justice Scalia, who
believed that the injunction was obviously a prior restraint,239
ample ammunition to support his claim that the majority allowed
political issues to cloud its judgment regarding the injunction's
See, e.g., New York Times, 403 U.S. 713 (order prohibiting publication of information
regarding Vietnam War); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (order
prohibiting publication of inculpatory information pertaining to criminal defendant).
" See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 390 (1973) (dismissing argument that order forbidding newspaper from classifying ads
by reference to sex was prior restraint); National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs. v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978) (upholding, without discussion of prior restraint issue, an injunction
prohibiting professional society from adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or
guideline stating or implying that competitive bidding among engineers was unethical). See
generally The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 276 n.44
(1994) (commenting that Madsen's standard of review for content-neutral injunction was
actually far more rigorous than standard applied to content-based injunction in Professional
Engineers).
' In Keefe, one of the Court's most frequently cited prior restraint cases, the injunction
at issue was facially content-neutral, simply forbidding certain persons "from passing out
pamphlets, leaflets or literature of any kind, and from picketing, anywhere in the City of
Westchester, Illinois." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971).
Nevertheless, the Court had no trouble finding that the injunction "so far as it imposes prior
restraint on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on First
Amendment rights." Id. at 418.
' Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("lAin injunction against speech is the very
prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint.").
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constitutionality.24 ° Justice Scalia's analysis was as thin as (if
not thinner than) the majority's"4 but his long string citation to
cases in which the Court previously struck down injunctions as
prior restraints 242 -cases that are not even mentioned by the
majority-certainly gives one pause regarding the majority
opinion's legitimacy on this point. Justice Scalia's pointed (and
technically valid) comment noting that there was "no antecedent in
[the Court's] cases" for the majority's distinction between content-
based and content-neutral injunctions 243 further bolsters the
sense that the majority engaged in sleight of hand in order to reach
a politically popular decision. After all of this, is it any wonder
that the protestors and others responded to Madsen as they did?
B. THE ISSUE OF MOTIVE IN CONTENT-DISCRIMINATION
In contrast to its discussion of the prior restraint argument, the
Madsen majority engaged in a reasonably lengthy analysis of the
protestors' argument that the injunction was impermissibly
viewpoint-based. Ultimately, however, the majority's analysis of
this issue suffered from a defect similar to its prior restraint
analysis-a refusal to recognize or reconcile potentially conflicting
precedents. Though acknowledging that the injunction affected
only anti-abortion protestors, the Madsen majority rejected the
petitioners' argument that it was necessarily viewpoint-based and,
thus, deserving of strict scrutiny. Instead, viewing the lower
court's "purpose as the threshold consideration," the majority
concluded that the injunction was content-neutral because it was
-o Id. at 784-85.
1Aside from his long citation to certain cases, Justice Scalia did little more than parrot
rhetoric regarding the Court's antipathy toward prior restraints. Id. at 797-98. With the
exception of Milkwagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), he also
ignored other cases in which the Court upheld injunctions against speech. Moreover, Justice
Scalia miscited at least one case, characterizing it as a prior restraint case when it was
decided under preemption principles. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 799 (citing Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957)).
m Madsen, 512 U.S. at 798 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
' Id. at 797-98 n.3 ('IT]hat injunctions are not prior restraints (or at least not the nasty
kind) if they restrain only speech in a certain area, or if the basis for their issuance is not
content but prior unlawful conduct... has no antecedent in our cases.").
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issued as a result of petitioners' past violent conduct rather than
their message.244  Recognizing, however, that even content-
neutral injunctions carry greater risks of censorship and abuse
than generally applicable ordinances, the majority created a new,
slightly higher standard of review than that used for typical
content-neutral restrictions.245
Justice Scalia attacked the Court's new standard, arguing that
the majority should have reviewed the injunction under strict
scrutiny, the standard used for content-based restrictions. He
primarily disagreed with the majority's inquiry into the lower
court's purpose in determining that the injunction was content-
neutral and subject to lesser scrutiny:
"Our cases have consistently held that illicit legisla-
tive intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of
the First Amendment." The vice of content-based
legislation-what renders it deserving of strict
scrutiny-is not that it is always used for invidious,
thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to
use for those purposes.246
Because an "injunction, [even if content-neutral, lent] itselfjust as
readily to the targeted suppression of particular ideas" as a
content-based statute, Justice Scalia concluded that strict scrutiny
was warranted.247
There is much in the Court's prior jurisprudence to support
Justice Scalia's criticism. Some of the Court's seminal decisions
refused to inquire into governmental purpose when determining a
regulation's constitutionality. In Police Department v. Mosely,248
the Court struck down as content-based an ordinance prohibiting
all picketing except labor picketing near a school despite the city's
admittedly neutral purpose of preventing violence by non-labor
214 Id. at 763-64.
245 Id. at 764-65 (asking whether "challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest").
21 Id. at 794 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part
(quoting Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991)).
2147 Id. at 793.
2" 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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picketers.249 Similarly, the Court in United States v. O'Brien25
emphatically declared legislative motive irrelevant and refused to
apply a heightened standard of review to a facially content-neutral
statute, even though the petitioner claimed that the statute was
prompted by the legislature's desire to suppress anti-Vietnam
protest." Government purpose was not wholly irrelevant to the
Court in these cases. In fact, the Court's treatment of content-
neutral and content-based regulations is apparently a device with
which it ferrets out illicit government purpose via the use of
objective tests:252 content-based laws, which are more likely to be
based on an illicit government purpose such as censorship, are
subject to strict scrutiny; in contrast, content-neutral laws, which
generally have more neutral motives, are subject to lesser scruti-
ny- 1 3 Thus, government purpose is important to the Court. But
rather than inquire into its actual existence, the Court more or less
presumes that purpose depending upon the nature of the regulation
and its potential for censorship.
The Madsen majority's statement that "purpose is the threshold
consideration" is seemingly at odds with the Court's seminal
decisions in this area. And the majority's willingness to examine
the injunction under a lesser standard, despite its recognition that
injunctions against protestors carry heightened risks of censorship
and abuse, appears to conflict with its past approach. In this
sense, the Madsen Court's treatment of the viewpoint-discrimina-
249 Id. at 101-02.
m 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
25 Id. at 382.
" See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 362 (1997) (noting Court's concern with ferreting out improper motivation); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (same); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227 (1983) (same);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44
Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 127 (same).
' See Kagan, supra note 252, at 451-56 (discussing function of Court's content-
based/content-neutral distinction in ferreting out illicit motive); Stone, supra note 252, at 230
("[Tihe probability that an improper motivation has tainted a decision to restrict expression
is far greater when the restriction is directed at a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of
information than when it is content-neutral."); Wells, supra note 10, at 175 n.67 ("[While] the
government obviously does not enact all content-based laws with improper motives,. . . the
likelihood of such motives has led the Court to require compelling justifications for all
content-based regulations.").
[Vol. 33:1
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tion issue may lend itself to claims that the Court bowed to politics
and engaged in result-oriented decision-making.
The Madsen majority's approach, however, is not wholly without
support. Though the Court's approach to governmental purpose is
largely as described above, there exist cases, stemming mainly from
the Court's decision in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,254 in
which the Court has inquired into governmental purpose. 5  In
Renton, the Court found a facially content-based ordinance
regulating the location of certain adult movie theaters 6 to be
content-neutral because it was not prompted by the government's
desire to regulate a particular message but by its desire to regulate
certain "secondary effects" of the expression, such as crime or
decreased property values. 7 In effect, the Renton Court inquired
into the purpose underlying the statute rather than looking to its
face to determine whether it was content-based or content-neutral.
Once the Renton Court determined the statute to be content-
neutral, it effortlessly upheld it under intermediate scrutiny.5
Renton thus provides some support for the Madsen Court's decision
to look to government purpose in determining the content-neutrali-
ty of the injunction.
Unfortunately, reliance on Renton to explain the Madsen Court's
actions may simply exacerbate the problems in the latter opinion.
Numerous scholars argued that Renton's inquiry into governmental
purpose was highly inconsistent with the Court's previous method
of determining content-neutral and content-based regulations. 9
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
2- Id. at 54.
' The ordinance prohibited any adult motion picture theater (defined as any theater
emphasizing sexually explicit material) from locating within 1000 feet of any residential
zone, church, or school. Id. at 44.
7 Id. at 48-50. The ordinance apparently was "designed to prevent crime, protect the
city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the
quality of the [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.'"
Id. at 48 (quoting ordinance).
" Id. at 50-54.
See Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
413, 452 (1993) (asserting that Renton is a "wholly unprecedented approach to the
understanding of content-neutrality"); Stone, supra note 209, at 115 (noting that prior to
Renton, the Court "in such circumstances ha[d] always invoked the stringent standards of
content-based review").- Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1908 (1989) ("Renton substantially revises first amendment
1998]
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They further expressed the fear that Renton ultimately would
result in the demise of the Court's stringent review of content-
based regulations26 ° and would "allow an easy path to censor-
ship."26' The Court's decision is also controversial among its own
members. The Court has rarely relied on the secondary effects
doctrine to support a decision.262 More often, it finds a way to
avoid using such reasoning."' Also, any time the majority
discusses the doctrine as even potentially applicable, it does so over
the strenuous objections of other Justices who argue that its "broad
application may encourage widespread official censorship."2"
Renton is thus something of a pariah in terms of Supreme Court
doctrine. To the extent that the Madsen majority relied on the
protestors' violent conduct rather than on the terms of the injunc-
tion itself as proof of content-neutrality, its reasoning is similar to
Renton and also may be suspect.
265
doctrine."); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The fact that adult
movie theaters may cause harmful 'secondary' land-use effects may arguably give Renton a
compelling reason to regulate such establishments; it does not mean, however, that such
regulations are content neutral.").
26 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 952 (2d ed.
1988) ("Carried to its logical conclusion, [the Renton] doctrine could gravely erode thd first
amendments protections."); Stone, supra note 209, at 115-16 (describing decision as
"disturbing, incoherent, and unsettling" and as threatening "to erode the coherence and
predictability of first amendment doctrine"); Williams, supra note 214, at 631-35 (describing
Renton as narrowing Court's focus regarding content discrimination).
"' David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms,' 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 93 (1997).
' See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Renton to
support proposition that "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral").
2s See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2327, 2342 (1997) (holding that purpose of
Communications Decency Act of 1996 was to protect against primary, rather than secondary,
effects of speech); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993)
(asserting that ban on distribution of commercial hand-bills on public sidewalks was not
enacted to prevent secondary effects); R-.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992)
(stating that ordinance prohibiting placement of burning cross on property as expression of
fighting words "is not directed to secondary effects within the meaning of Renton"); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (holding that law prohibiting display of signs at foreign
embassy focuses on "direct impact speech has on its listeners," and not on secondary effects).
264 Ward, 491 U.S. at 804 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Boos, 485 U.S. at 336
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the doctrine "certainly exacerbates the risk that
many laws designed to suppress disfavored speech will go undetected").
m Though Madsen did not discuss the secondary effects doctrine explicitly, the Madsen
respondents-various abortion clinics-urged the Court to rely on the rationale in order to
uphold the injunction. Brief for Respondents at 28-30, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.
512 U.S. 753 (1994) (No. 93-880). In light of such urging, the majority's use of similar
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To say that Renton is rarely invoked, however, is not to say that
it did not have a lasting effect on the Court's doctrine. If anything,
Renton created a doctrinal incoherence that likely led to the debate
between the Madsen majority and dissent. While the Renton Court
itself looked to the purpose underlying an ordinance, it also
specifically chastised the lower court for doing so. The lower court
ruled the ordinance unconstitutional because it found that a desire
to restrict the theaters' exercise of their First Amendment rights
was "a motivating factor" behind the ordinance.266 The Renton
Court found the lower court's imputation of illicit motive unwar-
ranted, observing that "[ilt is a familiar principle of constitutional
law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."267
To be sure, there is a difference between the purpose inquiries by
the Renton Court and the lower court. The lower court essentially
engaged in conjecture regarding the potential illicit motive behind
the ordinance. The difficulty in ferreting out such conjecture is
precisely what the O'Brien Court was trying to avoid. 6 The
Renton majority, on the other hand, merely looked to the reasons
proffered by the city in order to determine the nature of the
statute, thus avoiding such prophesizing.269  Unfortunately,
though this distinction may have been important to the Renton
Court, it did not explicitly say so. The Renton Court's unwilling-
ness to explain its distinction has further confused later doctrine.
As Professor Post notes:
reasoning without an explicit discussion of Renton may further exacerbate illusions of
political decision making.
' Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
26 Id. at 48 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 366, 383 (1968)).
68 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84; see also Post, supra note 19, at 1269 ("The project of
assessing the blameworthiness of government purposes is afflicted with notorious difficulties.
Courts tend to be skittish of the project because they are reluctant to point fingers of
accusation. Problems of evidence and interpretation abound.") (citation omitted).
' According to the Court, the "ordinance by its terms [was] designed" to prevent certain
secondary effects rather than to suppress speech. 475 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added). After
the initial lawsuit in Renton was commenced, the city amended the ordinance to add an
explanatory provision regarding the city's intent. 475 U.S. at 61 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1998]
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There is a pervasive ambiguity as to whether courts
are to assess the justification for a regulation (the
reasons that can be adduced for its passage) or the
motivation for a regulation (the actual psychological
intentions of those who enacted it). These are very
different inquiries, and yet the Court has persistent-
ly equivocated as to which it means to require. °
Not knowing exactly what to do, subsequent decisions both use and
eschew purpose analysis. Thus, purpose terminology occasionally
creeps into the Court's free speech decisions--especially when the
Court wants to uphold a content-neutral law. 17 ' Simultaneously,
the Court has reiterated its belief that governmental purpose is
irrelevant to determining a law's legitimacy-especially when it
wants to strike down a law that discriminates against certain
speech.27 2 The ultimate fallout of such schizophrenia is Madsen,
where both the majority and the dissent cite seemingly relevant
precedents in order to support their arguments, thus making the
decision seem completely political.
270 Post, supra note 19, at 1268 (emphasis in original).
27 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994) (noting that
challenged provisions of Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act were
content-neutral because their "design and operation... confirm that the purposes underlying
the enactment of the must-carry scheme are unrelated to the content of speech"); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principle inquiry in determining
content neutrality... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of disagreement with the message it conveys.... The government's purpose is the
controlling consideration.").
2"2 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117 (1991) (rejecting petitioners' argument that "discriminatory financial treatment is
suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain
ideas" and noting that past cases "have consistently held that illicit legislative intent is not
the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (holding law
unconstitutional even absent "evidence of an improper censorial motive").
[Vol. 33:1
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ga. L. Rev. 58 1998-1999
THEORETICAL ABYSS
C. IGNORING THE CEASE AND DESIST PROVISION IN SCHENCK-FOCUS-
ING ON MINUTIAE AT THE EXPENSE OF SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF
OFFENSIVE SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
Protestors and neutral observers characterized Schenck as a
victory for aggressive, "in-your-face" speech 3 even though the
Schenck Court made no such pronouncement. That characteriza-
tion of the Court's decision may simply be a wilful misunderstand-
ing-a case of people hearing what they want to hear. But the
Schenck majority's focus on minutiae likely facilitated such
manipulation. Out of roughly twelve pages, the majority opinion
spent almost five pages discussing the facts and lower court
opinions,274 one page discussing Madsen and its test,275 almost
five pages analyzing the Schenck buffer zones under Madsen,7 6
and barely one page discussing why the "cease and desist" provision
survived constitutional scrutiny. 7  Thus, the bulk of the Court's
analysis focuses on an explication of Madsen and its application to
the buffer zones, of which almost two pages explain in detail the
problems with the floating buffer zone and its resulting unconstitu-
tionality.7 In contrast, the Schenck majority "quickly refuted"
the petitioners' challenge to the "cease and desist" provision, noting
that it "was an effort to enhance petitioners' speech rights."2 9
Given the Schenck majority's focus on the buffer zones, along with
its relative dismissal of the challenge to the "cease and desist"
provision, it is unsurprising that protestors looked upon the Court's
decision to strike the most physically restrictive provision of the
injunction as momentous.
Ironically, the Court's discussion of the floating buffer zones was
simply a straightforward application of Madsen's requirement that
a content-neutral injunction "burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest."280 That aspect
273 See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text (discussing reaction to Schenck).
274 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 859-64 (1997).
275 Id. at 864-65.
276 Id. at 865-69.
277Id. at 869-70.
2" Id. at 866-68.
279 Id. at 870.
o Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
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of the decision broke no new ground-other than to say that buffer
zones cannot float. Indeed, it was relatively pedestrian. On the
other hand, the Schenck Court's decision to uphold the "cease and
desist" provision was momentous. Had the majority even minimal-
ly discussed that issue, the protestors and others might have
realized what they potentially lost.
The Court has long held that certain public property, like the
streets and sidewalks used by the anti-abortion protestors, must be
held open for speech purposes.28' The government cannot shut off
communicative activity altogether in such fora and the Court will
strictly scrutinize content-based restrictions in them. 2 A funda-
mental aspect of the Court's jurisprudence in this area involves the
notion that the government cannot regulate speech in the public
forum simply because some people take offense to it: "[I]n public
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outra-
geous, speech in order to provide 'adequate "breathing space" to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' "2"' One could
argue that the "cease and desist" provision violated these doctrinal
tenets. The district court's order allowed persons entering or
leaving the clinic to terminate even peaceful counseling sessions by
indicating a desire for the counselors to leave the fifteen-foot buffer
zone."s It is not unlikely that many of those entering or leaving
the clinic would simply silence a counselor because they did not
"1 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality decision) ("Wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thought between citizens and discussing public questions.").
' See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(discussing standards of review to be applied to restrictions of speech in a public forum). A
city may regulate speech in a public forum for content-neutral reasons, such as to keep public
order. The Court reviews such restrictions of speech under intermediate scrutiny. Id.
' Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,322 (1988) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1987)); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that public
display cannot be prohibited simply because society finds actions offensive); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (finding that constitutional test for protected speech
is not whether it is "sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that criminal punishment of public
display of four-letter expletive based upon its offensiveness was unconstitutional).
'" Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1440 (citing paragraph 1(c)
of the Schenck injunction), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v.
Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part en banc, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
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agree with or were offended by their anti-abortion message. 5
The district court's grounding of the provision partly in the right of
persons entering and leaving the clinic to be free from unwanted
speech further bolsters this conclusion. 6  In this light, the
Schenck Court's refusal to examine the "cease and desist" provision
in depth is odd-especially given its acknowledgment that the lower
court's basis for the injunction was faulty.21 Adding to the
almost surreal nature of the Schenck Court's treatment of the
"cease and desist" provision is the fact that Madsen struck down a
similar provision prohibiting all uninvited approaches within 300
feet of the abortion clinic, primarily because it suppressed speech
based upon its offensiveness. 28  Yet the Schenck Court barely
attempted to reconcile its decision with Madsen.289
The Schenck Court's blithe treatment of the "cease and desist"
provision raises two significant dangers. First, by giving that
provision short shrift, the opinion gives a far greater sense of
' Petitioners made this exact argument regarding the "cease and desist" provision. Brief
for Petitioners at 38-44, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) (No. 95-1065).
See also Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1994) (striking down
"cease and desist" order).
Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. at 1435-36.
See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 870 ("We doubt that the District Court's reason for including
that provision-'to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities to be
left alone'-accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence in this area.").
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994).
'
8
, The Court made a rather feeble attempt to reconcile its decision upholding the "cease
and desist" provision with its decision in Madsen to strike down the "no approach" zone,
noting that the injunctive provision in Madsen created a much larger zone than the fifteen-
foot zone in Schenck and, thus, was far broader than necessary to ensure access to the clinic.
Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 870 n.12. That attempt, however, ignored that the Madsen Court
found the access concerns intermixed with the issue of regulating offensive speech. Madsen,
512 U.S. at 774. The Madsen Court noted that
it is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches
of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful
that contact may be .... "As a general matter, we have indicated that
in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate "breathing space" to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'" ... The "consent"
requirement alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech
than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the
clinic.
Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). To say that the Schenck zone is
constitutional merely because it is smaller is to ignore the offensive speech issue raised by
the earlier decision.
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ga. L. Rev. 61 1998-1999
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
importance to the opinion's buffer zone analysis than it deserves.
In this instance, public manipulation of the opinion by protestors
and others was the ultimate result. Second, by upholding the
"cease and desist" provision without engaging in any serious
discussion of its potential inconsistency with past cases, the opinion
opens itself up to future criticism that it ignored jurisprudential
principles to reach a particular result.290 Justice Scalia's out-
raged comment that "[tihe most important holding in today's
opinion is tucked away in the seeming detail of the 'cease and
desist' discussion in the penultimate paragraph of analysis"29'
portends such future censure. In either situation, the legitimacy of
the Court's decision is undermined.
CONCLUSION
In fifty years will we look back on Madsen and Schenck as
political decisions just as we do Dennis and Yates? Though the
former cases do not fit the pattern of manipulation of the earlier
communist decisions, the Court's willingness to default to conve-
nient rhetoric and precedent in the abortion protest cases may
ultimately cause just such a cynical response. Certainly, the
protestors' comments regarding the cases have already started
down that path. But more is at stake here than the ultimate
viability of Madsen and Schenck. The Court's apparent inconsisten-
cy in decision-making undermines its legitimacy as an institution.
As Professor Dworkin has noted:
Integrity demands that the public standards of the
community be both made and seen, so far as this is
possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of
justice and fairness in the right relation .... [Jiud-
ges must conceive the body of law they administer as
a whole rather than as a set of discrete decisions
that they are free to make or amend one by one ....
See, e.g., Sean Gillen, Case Note, The Supreme Court Drops the Buffered Ball and
Ceases and Desists from a Tradition of Stare Decisis in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 31
CREIGHTON L. REv. 953, 995-96 (1998) (arguing that abortion politics caused Court to ignore
jurisprudential principles in upholding "cease and desist' provision).
2' Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 871 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[They must form] some coherent principle whose
influence then extends to the natural limits of its
authority.2
92
The need for coherence and legitimacy would seem to be especial-
ly true in the area of freedom of speech, one of our most celebrated
liberties. Yet, to date, the Court has not explicitly "plunge[d into
its First Amendment decisions] at the level of principle."293  It is
time that it did so. Though it likely will prove difficult to engage
in such a task, it is not impossible.2 94  As I have argued else-
where, the overall structure of the Court's free speech jurispru-
dence-as opposed to its rhetoric-is already consistent with a
philosophy of autonomy based upon the works of Immanuel
Kant.29 5 An explicit adoption of Kantian principles and further
explication regarding how they propel current and future doctrine
might allow the Court to climb out of its theoretical abyss.296 In
22 ROBERT DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 167, 169,219 (1986); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH 69 (2d ed. 1986) ("[The Court must act rigorously on
principle, else it undermines the justification for its power.").
KALVEN, supra note 2, at 3.
For years, numerous theorists have proposed authoritative bases that they believe
should or do govern the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995); C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 979 (1997); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
See Wells, supra note 10.
Not all scholars agree that use of foundational principles to decide cases is necessary
or even good. Professor Sunstein, for example, argues that "incompletely theorized
agreements"--those in which people agree on a particular rule or outcome but disagree
regarding its background justification-are a positive aspect of judicial decision-making.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-44 (1996). While there
may be advantages to such agreements in certain circumstances, problems arise in those
instances in which we do not agree on a particular rule or outcome, as demonstrated in the
communist and abortion protest cases. In the absence of agreement on the rule, lack of a
coherent theory simply exacerbates public perception regarding the political nature of the
Court's action. As Professor Fallon has noted:
Despite the possibility of reasonable disagreement in constitutional law,
we trust the Supreme Court to decide contested issues, largely on the
ground that the Court's decisions will at least be disciplined by the
demands of principle and by the requirement of articulate reason giving.
... For the most part, it may be fair for the Court simply to presume
that prior decisions have established doctrine that reasonably imple-
1998]
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turn, explicit application of such principles may explain and
legitimize the Court's actions in Madsen and Schenck, including its
decision to uphold the controversial "cease and desist" provi-
sion.297 The manner in which the Court communicates and
supports its decisions matters. Protestor response to Madsen and
Schenck are but a preview of the future consequences of the Court's
failure to realize this fact.
ments constitutional principles. But when the Court's majority declines
a dissenting opinion's express challenge to justify its decision at a deeper
level, it refuses to accept the full discipline of articulate justification that
helps to support the legitimacy of judicial review.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 117 (1997).
" See generally Christina E. Wells, Bringing Coherence to the Law of Injunctions Against
Expression (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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